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Aristotle: From sense to science.

University of California, Berkeley.

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Aristotle: From sense to science.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Aristotle: From sense to science./
作者:	Yurdin, Joel Solomon.
面頁冊數:	174 p.
附註:	Advisers: Alan Code; Barry Stroud.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International69-09A.
標題:	Literature, Classical. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3331853
ISBN:	9780549836117

Aristotle: From sense to science.
Yurdin, Joel Solomon.

Aristotle: From sense to science. - 174 p.

Advisers: Alan Code; Barry Stroud.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2008.

Recent discussions of Aristotle's theory of cognitive development focus on the highest stages of development---the transition from everyday concepts to scientific knowledge. This focus neglects Aristotle's account of the earlier stages of cognitive development. It also over-intellectualizes his core conceptions of the lower cognitive capacities and obscures his view of the relations between non-human animal and human cognition. I offer an interpretation of the early stages of Aristotle's theory---the transition from having only episodes of perception to also having grasps of universals. In explaining the theory of development, I pay special attention to his conception of a capacity that mediates between perception and intellect: imagination. Imagination explains key steps in the transitions from merely perceptual cognition to cognition involving grasps of universals and from non-explanatory cognition to explanatory knowledge.

ISBN: 9780549836117Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017779
Literature, Classical.

Aristotle: From sense to science.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-09, Section: A, page: 3582.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2008.
520 $a Recent discussions of Aristotle's theory of cognitive development focus on the highest stages of development---the transition from everyday concepts to scientific knowledge. This focus neglects Aristotle's account of the earlier stages of cognitive development. It also over-intellectualizes his core conceptions of the lower cognitive capacities and obscures his view of the relations between non-human animal and human cognition. I offer an interpretation of the early stages of Aristotle's theory---the transition from having only episodes of perception to also having grasps of universals. In explaining the theory of development, I pay special attention to his conception of a capacity that mediates between perception and intellect: imagination. Imagination explains key steps in the transitions from merely perceptual cognition to cognition involving grasps of universals and from non-explanatory cognition to explanatory knowledge.
520 $a The most important feature of imaginative states (phantasmata ) is their ability to be retained and grouped. When enough imaginative states have been associated, one has an "experience (empeiria)," and having an experience, I argue, is having an at least preliminary grasp of a universal. The fact that imaginative states can be retained and grouped is a key difference between imaginative states and perceptual states ( aisthemata). Perceptual states cannot be retained and grouped because they are object-dependent: one can have a perceptual state only if there is an object present that has the sensible feature cognized in the state.
520 $a Imagination is also important for the transition from non-explanatory cognition to explanatory knowledge. I argue that progress toward explanatory knowledge is made even in the elementary operations of imagination. Association of imaginative states, which is performed even by non-human animals, involves a certain kind of proto-awareness of causes. Though at any moment the animal has perceptual and imaginative states caused by many different objects, the animal typically associates states caused by the same object: the roundness and blueness of the blueberry are associated, rather than the roundness of the blueberry and the greenness of the leaf. This proto-awareness of causes marks the first stage in a process of incremental development of explanatory cognition.
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