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Kant and the Structure of the Given.

Williams, Jessica J.

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Kant and the Structure of the Given.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Kant and the Structure of the Given./
作者:	Williams, Jessica J.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
面頁冊數:	234 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-10, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International82-10A.
標題:	Epistemology. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28115651
ISBN:	9798698531142

Kant and the Structure of the Given.
Williams, Jessica J.

Kant and the Structure of the Given. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 234 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-10, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2017.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

The aim of this dissertation is to provide an interpretation that can resolve the prima facie tension between Kant's simultaneous commitment to the duality of the faculties (the Duality Principle) and the claim that they must work together to produce cognition (the Togetherness Principle). This tension is at the center of the recent debate between conceptualist and nonconceptualist interpretations of the Critique of Pure Reason. I aim to resolve the tension by accommodating Kant's commitment to the non-conceptual nature of space and time (the Duality Principle) while explaining the fundamental role of the understanding not only in judgment but also in perception (the Togetherness Principle). Drawing on the contemporary distinction between the content of perception and the requirements for the possession of that content, I argue that the primary content of empirical and pure intuition is non-conceptual. Against most nonconceptualists, however, I argue that this content can only be "given" to subjects who possess certain conceptual capacities that, for Kant, are fundamentally linked to the conditions for the unity of apperception. There is an important sense in which conceptual capacities transform what is given in intuition, so that what Kant calls "perception" involves the introduction of a conceptual structure into the non-conceptual given.

ISBN: 9798698531142Subjects--Topical Terms:

896969
Epistemology.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Prima facie tension

Kant and the Structure of the Given.
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