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Epistemological implications of repr...

Harmon, Ian Thomas.

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Epistemological implications of representational pluralism.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Epistemological implications of representational pluralism./
作者:	Harmon, Ian Thomas.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2014,
面頁冊數:	198 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-06(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-06A(E).
標題:	Epistemology. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3673637
ISBN:	9781321512700

Epistemological implications of representational pluralism.
Harmon, Ian Thomas.

Epistemological implications of representational pluralism. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2014 - 198 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-06(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2014.

In this dissertation I argue that the framework under which epistemology operates should be broadened to account for developments in cognitive science that indicate that a good deal of cognition and reasoning involves the use of non-linguistic representations.

ISBN: 9781321512700Subjects--Topical Terms:

896969
Epistemology.

Epistemological implications of representational pluralism.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-06(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Robert Cummins.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2014.
520 $a In this dissertation I argue that the framework under which epistemology operates should be broadened to account for developments in cognitive science that indicate that a good deal of cognition and reasoning involves the use of non-linguistic representations.
520 $a In chapter 1, I argue that, although epistemology is the theory of knowledge, epistemologists generally operate as though their field is simply the theory of propositional knowledge. Epistemologists generally assume that knowledge is a certain type of belief relation to a true proposition. However, cognitive science indicates that many of our mental representations are not belief-like at all, and thereby, not belief relations to propositions. Rather, the mind employs representations that take the form of images, scale models, activation patterns, and so on. I call this claim representational pluralism. If some of these non-linguistic representations are constitutive of knowledge, as I argue that they are in later chapters, then this requires a substantial revision of the traditional epistemological framework. I proceed to introduce some potential consequences of departing from the propositional knowledge tradition in epistemology. These consequences pertain most directly to two issues, namely, philosophical methodology and our understanding of normative standards of rationality.
520 $a In chapter 2 I discuss knowledge-how, a type of knowledge that many have argued is non-propositional. In the first part of the chapter I discuss two intellectualist positions, that is, positions that hold that know-how is propositional. Stanley and Williamson argue that propositional knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for know-how, while Bengson and Moffett argue that propositional knowledge is not sufficient, but is necessary, for know-how.
520 $a In chapter 3 I argue that epistemology's failure to take representational pluralism seriously has skewed the field's understanding of normative standards of rationality. I discuss two ways in which epistemology's normative standards of rationality are limited. First, they apply only to agents with purely linguistic or belief-like cognitive systems. Second, they apply only to cognitive systems that are capable of meeting them, due to what I call the ought-can principle.
520 $a In chapter 4, I examine the role that knowledge plays in two domains: everyday life and the institution of science. In everyday contexts, I argue that knowledge plays a warrant-granting role for action. This way of thinking about knowledge has drawn some attention in the epistemology literature from Keith DeRose, Jason Stanley, John Hawthorne, and Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath, amongst others. However, I argue that none of these "pragmatic encroachment" approaches draw the correct connection between knowledge and practical affairs. In particular, many of these accounts are designed to be supplements to more traditional, independent accounts of knowledge.
520 $a In chapter 5, I present summaries of the preceding chapters. I then conclude that epistemology, in order to be the theory of knowledge, rather than the theory of propositional knowledge, must become more pluralistic. This is not to say that we need to abandon studies of propositional knowledge. But rather, epistemology as a field should become more fragmented, specialized, and connected to scientific accounts of the mind and cognition. (Abstract shortened by UMI.).
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