東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

The virtues of Bayesian epistemology.

Gwin, Mary Frances.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

The virtues of Bayesian epistemology.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The virtues of Bayesian epistemology./
Author:	Gwin, Mary Frances.
Description:	182 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-04, Section: A, page: 1427.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International73-04A.
Subject:	Epistemology. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3488133
ISBN:	9781267079169

The virtues of Bayesian epistemology.
Gwin, Mary Frances.

The virtues of Bayesian epistemology. - 182 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-04, Section: A, page: 1427.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Oklahoma, 2011.

The aim of this dissertation is to address the intersection of two normative epistemologies, Bayesian confirmation theory (BCT) and virtue epistemology (VE). While both are successful in many respects, I argue that the constraints on rational degrees of belief provided by Bayesianism are not enough. VE offers additional constraints on degrees of belief, and plays a salutary role for BCT in the form constraints from background knowledge on the more subjective aspects of Bayesianism. Chapter 1 is an introduction to my project. Chapter 2 presents a brief review of the logic and epistemology of science, Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Chapter 3 presents a recent development in cognitive science, rational analysis, which employs a Bayesian approach to understanding human reasoning and bases everyday rationality in formal rationality. Chapter 4 presents historical motivations for turning to virtue epistemology. I argue that given historical considerations virtue epistemology offers a truly novel approach by shifting the focus of analysis from properties of beliefs alone to properties of agents. Chapter 5 presents a development of a particular, reliabilist view in virtue epistemology. Chapter 6 concludes my dissertation. In this chapter I argue that Bayesian Confirmation Theory, as an epistemology of science, should be embedded within virtue epistemology and that at least one familiar problem, the problem of the priors, can be ameliorated.

ISBN: 9781267079169Subjects--Topical Terms:

896969
Epistemology.

The virtues of Bayesian epistemology.
LDR:02328nmm a2200289 4500 001 2057833
005 20150622091125.5
008 170521s2011 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781267079169
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI3488133
035 $a AAI3488133
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Gwin, Mary Frances. $3 3171717
245 1 4 $a The virtues of Bayesian epistemology.
300 $a 182 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-04, Section: A, page: 1427.
500 $a Adviser: James Hawthorne.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Oklahoma, 2011.
520 $a The aim of this dissertation is to address the intersection of two normative epistemologies, Bayesian confirmation theory (BCT) and virtue epistemology (VE). While both are successful in many respects, I argue that the constraints on rational degrees of belief provided by Bayesianism are not enough. VE offers additional constraints on degrees of belief, and plays a salutary role for BCT in the form constraints from background knowledge on the more subjective aspects of Bayesianism. Chapter 1 is an introduction to my project. Chapter 2 presents a brief review of the logic and epistemology of science, Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Chapter 3 presents a recent development in cognitive science, rational analysis, which employs a Bayesian approach to understanding human reasoning and bases everyday rationality in formal rationality. Chapter 4 presents historical motivations for turning to virtue epistemology. I argue that given historical considerations virtue epistemology offers a truly novel approach by shifting the focus of analysis from properties of beliefs alone to properties of agents. Chapter 5 presents a development of a particular, reliabilist view in virtue epistemology. Chapter 6 concludes my dissertation. In this chapter I argue that Bayesian Confirmation Theory, as an epistemology of science, should be embedded within virtue epistemology and that at least one familiar problem, the problem of the priors, can be ameliorated.
590 $a School code: 0169.
650 4 $a Epistemology. $3 896969
650 4 $a Logic. $3 529544
650 4 $a Philosophy of Science. $3 894954
690 $a 0393
690 $a 0395
690 $a 0402
710 2 $a The University of Oklahoma. $b Department of Philosophy. $3 2101401
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 73-04A.
790 $a 0169
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2011
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3488133