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The identity of substance and attrib...

Williams, R. Jason.

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The identity of substance and attribute in Spinoza's metaphysics.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The identity of substance and attribute in Spinoza's metaphysics./
作者:	Williams, R. Jason.
面頁冊數:	61 p.
附註:	Adviser: Susanna Goodin.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International45-05.
標題:	History, European. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=1443267

The identity of substance and attribute in Spinoza's metaphysics.
Williams, R. Jason.

The identity of substance and attribute in Spinoza's metaphysics. - 61 p.

Adviser: Susanna Goodin.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wyoming, 2007.

I argue for a strict identity interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics. This interpretation is contrasted with two of the leading interpretations of Spinoza on the relation between attribute and substance; in particular the interpretations of Jonathan Bennett and Edwin Curley. I show that there are difficulties with both of these interpretations.Subjects--Topical Terms:

1018076
History, European.

The identity of substance and attribute in Spinoza's metaphysics.
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035 $a (UMI)AAI1443267
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100 1 $a Williams, R. Jason. $3 1296562
245 1 4 $a The identity of substance and attribute in Spinoza's metaphysics.
300 $a 61 p.
500 $a Adviser: Susanna Goodin.
500 $a Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-05, page: 2208.
502 $a Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wyoming, 2007.
520 $a I argue for a strict identity interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics. This interpretation is contrasted with two of the leading interpretations of Spinoza on the relation between attribute and substance; in particular the interpretations of Jonathan Bennett and Edwin Curley. I show that there are difficulties with both of these interpretations.
520 $a In response I claim that the relation between attribute and substance in Spinoza is one of identity. Each attribute of a substance is in fact the essence of that substance. I argue that the essence of substance, for Spinoza, is identical to that substance. To explain why Spinoza claims that there is more than one attribute I appeal to the Suarez's and Descartes' theory of distinctions. Principle attributes are only conceptually distinct from substance. I also suggest that Spinoza holds that each attribute of substance is only conceptually distinct from every other attribute. This would mean that each attribute refers to the same thing.
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710 2 0 $a University of Wyoming. $3 1017859
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856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=1443267