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Plato's apology: Dialectic in the ea...
~
Schwartz, Matthew Russell.
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Plato's apology: Dialectic in the early dialogues.
紀錄類型:
書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:
Plato's apology: Dialectic in the early dialogues./
作者:
Schwartz, Matthew Russell.
面頁冊數:
191 p.
附註:
Adviser: Michael Forster.
Contained By:
Dissertation Abstracts International67-05A.
標題:
History, Ancient. -
電子資源:
http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3219583
ISBN:
9780542711602
Plato's apology: Dialectic in the early dialogues.
Schwartz, Matthew Russell.
Plato's apology: Dialectic in the early dialogues.
- 191 p.
Adviser: Michael Forster.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2006.
Socrates, so the story goes, was wise in so far as he was aware of not knowing. He spent his days in the Athenian marketplace attempting to instill his unique brand of self-knowledge in his compatriots. If someone claimed to know that a man was, say, pious or just or courageous, Socrates tested this person, ultimately revealing that he did not in fact know what he claimed to know. He did this in the following fashion. He compelled his interlocutor to assert a thesis about the subject under discussion. Next, he posed a series of questions, eliciting further of his interlocutor's beliefs. Finally, he showed that these latter admissions entailed the negation of the interlocutor's initial claim. Following scholarly tradition, let's call an argument of this form a "standard elenchus."
ISBN: 9780542711602Subjects--Topical Terms:
516261
History, Ancient.
Plato's apology: Dialectic in the early dialogues.
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Socrates, so the story goes, was wise in so far as he was aware of not knowing. He spent his days in the Athenian marketplace attempting to instill his unique brand of self-knowledge in his compatriots. If someone claimed to know that a man was, say, pious or just or courageous, Socrates tested this person, ultimately revealing that he did not in fact know what he claimed to know. He did this in the following fashion. He compelled his interlocutor to assert a thesis about the subject under discussion. Next, he posed a series of questions, eliciting further of his interlocutor's beliefs. Finally, he showed that these latter admissions entailed the negation of the interlocutor's initial claim. Following scholarly tradition, let's call an argument of this form a "standard elenchus."
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The aim of my dissertation is to debunk and replace this story. I want to do this for a simple reason: though scholars widely assume it, as a story about Socrates' common modus operandi it is false. To show that it's false I introduce and explain two formally distinct argumentative strategies, which I call "interpretive" and "definition-testing" elenchi. I argue that many elenchi commonly thought standard in form are in fact definition-testing or interpretive. For instance, I examine all of the arguments of the Euthyphro and demonstrate that it actually does not contain a single standard elenchus. The Laches, which I also discuss in detail, contains only one.
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Just as I argue against the common conception of the form of the elenchus, so I argue against the common conception of its functions. Scholars agree that Socrates employs his method to produce certain affects in his interlocutors, for instance, to show them that they don't know what they think they know. But does Socrates' method also impact his own beliefs? On this question scholars disagree. A second aim of my dissertation is to establish and show how the elenchus is a constructive philosophical method, one by which Socrates makes progress towards answers to the questions he addresses.
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http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3219583
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