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Reciprocity without cooperation: Sm...

Wanderley, Fernanda.

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Reciprocity without cooperation: Small producer networks and political identities in Bolivia.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Reciprocity without cooperation: Small producer networks and political identities in Bolivia./
作者:	Wanderley, Fernanda.
面頁冊數:	306 p.
附註:	Adviser: David Stark.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-05A.
標題:	Sociology, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3174918
ISBN:	9780542133008

Reciprocity without cooperation: Small producer networks and political identities in Bolivia.
Wanderley, Fernanda.

Reciprocity without cooperation: Small producer networks and political identities in Bolivia. - 306 p.

Adviser: David Stark.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Columbia University, 2005.

This dissertation is about the social structure of small-scale production in a developing country---Bolivia. The question I propose in this study is why a rich associational life with widespread cooperation and collective action has not promoted the risk sharing between firms in core business transactions. Small production in Bolivia is embedded in a socio-cultural milieu formed by ethnic, kin, neighborhood relationships besides formal associations that, instead of extending general trust and reciprocity, has sustained arm's length transactions between firms. The argument of this dissertation is that the boundaries between cooperation and non-cooperation within the same group of people are the result of cognitive and social connections involved in socializing risks. Cooperation depends on the articulation of communities of interests and the organization of joint efforts. The arguments I present in this dissertation are formulated against two main approaches: (1) the rational choice framework and (2) the cultural approach. My explanation for the uneven levels of cooperation between and within firms is built on a third alternative proposed by the new economic sociology, where there are neither individuals with prior and known preferences that guide their decisions nor is there spontaneous solidarity on the basis of shared values. The small producers' sense of community of interests is grounded in their weak legitimacy as economic actors and their vulnerability in relation to an unfriendly institutional environment. The defense against state actions and the demand for benefits from it are the core of their common interests, and therefore, the accepted basis for joint efforts. This restricted community of interests militates against a broad comprehension of the gains that cooperation can generate for individual actors searching for profit. Moreover, the common understandings and mutual expectations that consolidate defensive collective efforts are structured in a form of association with concrete institutions such as reciprocity and solidarity that carry specific meanings and practices not directly adequate to systematic inter-firm cooperation in the production process. Continuous cooperation for profit would demand different expectations, "authoritative references" of fairness and punishment and different criteria of worth to distribute the costs and benefits of joint actions.

ISBN: 9780542133008Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017541
Sociology, General.

Reciprocity without cooperation: Small producer networks and political identities in Bolivia.
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