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Equivocal enforcement: Regulatory di...

Belova, Anna.

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Equivocal enforcement: Regulatory disputes in OSHA.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Equivocal enforcement: Regulatory disputes in OSHA./
作者:	Belova, Anna.
面頁冊數:	138 p.
附註:	Adviser: Wayne Gray.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-03A.
標題:	Economics, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3209377
ISBN:	9780542578052

Equivocal enforcement: Regulatory disputes in OSHA.
Belova, Anna.

Equivocal enforcement: Regulatory disputes in OSHA. - 138 p.

Adviser: Wayne Gray.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Clark University, 2006.

Research on government regulation to date has neglected existence and effects of the negotiations between the agency and the regulatees. This thesis explores regulatory disputes in the context of Occupational Safety and Health regulations. The following questions are addressed. Which circumstances in the enforcement-compliance scenario result in a dispute? What determines firms' success in negotiating the "punishment"? How does an option to appeal OSHA decisions affect firm compliance?

ISBN: 9780542578052Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Equivocal enforcement: Regulatory disputes in OSHA.
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245 1 0 $a Equivocal enforcement: Regulatory disputes in OSHA.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-03, Section: A, page: 1019.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Clark University, 2006.
520 $a Research on government regulation to date has neglected existence and effects of the negotiations between the agency and the regulatees. This thesis explores regulatory disputes in the context of Occupational Safety and Health regulations. The following questions are addressed. Which circumstances in the enforcement-compliance scenario result in a dispute? What determines firms' success in negotiating the "punishment"? How does an option to appeal OSHA decisions affect firm compliance?
520 $a Theoretical analysis of regulatory disputes is carried out using a sequential bargaining game between the regulator and the firm. The players are uncertain about true compliance status and update their estimates with information that arrives gradually over the course of negotiations. The analysis indicates that the firm is more likely to negotiate if the variance of the regulator's estimate is high, the rates of new information arrival are high, and this information is not too "noisy". The firms that go further along in the appeals process get more substantial reductions in "punishment" due to selectivity bias.
520 $a Empirical analysis of regulatory disputes is performed using OSHA violations at pulp and paper, oil, and steel industry establishments in 1990-2000. Results suggest that citations produced by more thorough inspections are less likely to be disputed. Larger and more profitable firms have an advantage in negotiating with OSHA due to economies of scale in legal expenditures. Success of an appeal is primarily determined by the initial properties of the citation---more serious proposed "punishment" results in more substantial reductions of the same.
520 $a Finally, a modified Detection-Controlled Estimation, which accounts for "false negative" and "false positive" regulatory errors, is proposed to analyze the relationship between regulatory disputes and compliance. If appeals process is a strategic substitute for abatement then actively disputing firms should violate more often. However, results show that firms are more likely to comply if they disputed frequently in the past. Are the appeals used to correct regulatory errors? The finding that the estimated rate of the "false accusations" by OSHA (3.3 percent) is similar to the fraction of inspections with deleted violations (3.9 percent) is consistent with this idea.
590 $a School code: 0048.
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