東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Illegal and legal immigration and do...

Pena, Anita Alves.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Illegal and legal immigration and domestic public policy.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Illegal and legal immigration and domestic public policy./
Author:	Pena, Anita Alves.
Description:	137 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Michael J. Boskin.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International68-06A.
Subject:	Economics, Agricultural. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3267598
ISBN:	9780549062691

Illegal and legal immigration and domestic public policy.
Pena, Anita Alves.

Illegal and legal immigration and domestic public policy. - 137 p.

Adviser: Michael J. Boskin.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2007.

This dissertation is concerned with illegal and legal immigration and domestic public policy. Chapter 1 presents institutional and political history at federal and state levels. Chapter 2 asks to what extent geographic clustering in U.S. border states is attributable to differences in state-provided public aid. California, has been shown to have a disproportionate number of legal immigrant welfare users, but little evidence exists concerning illegal persons. Illegal immigrants may collect welfare benefits on behalf of legal children or by using false documents, and legal status verification is often unnecessary for education or public medical services. Evidence from a nationally-representative farmworker survey featuring direct legal status data does not support welfare migration for any immigrant group. Conversely, U.S. Census data on immigrants in industries with lower illegal concentrations are consistent with welfare migration, even after the 1996 federal welfare reform. Chapter 3 examines if and how state-level labor market, agricultural, demographic, and public policy characteristics persuade or dissuade illegal and legal farmworker migration from Mexico. Results indicate that, consistent with social capital literature, personal and community networks are primary determinants of locational choices. Conversely, border enforcement significantly deters migration to certain areas. Results are strongest for California migrants and for experienced migrants relative to new ones. Chapter 4 hypothesizes how a new program granting amnesty to illegal immigrant farmworkers present in the U.S. would affect agricultural labor markets. Earnings differentials between illegal and legal workers, decomposed by hourly-equivalent wages and hours worked, as well as public aid program participation decisions, are studied. Illegal immigrants are shown to make three to five percent less in hourly wages, to work one to two fewer hours per week, and to have less than a five percent lower probability of program participation than their legal immigrant counterparts. Differentials are smaller for Californian workers. The analysis suggests that a new legalization program would likely have minimal effects on the earnings of currently illegal agricultural workers. An extension argues that if employers pass-through labor cost increases to consumers via food prices, the implicit tax rate on agricultural products would be similarly minimal.

ISBN: 9780549062691Subjects--Topical Terms:

626648
Economics, Agricultural.

Illegal and legal immigration and domestic public policy.
LDR:03338nam 2200289 a 45 001 957253
005 20110630
008 110630s2007 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9780549062691
035 $a (UMI)AAI3267598
035 $a AAI3267598
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Pena, Anita Alves. $3 1280607
245 1 0 $a Illegal and legal immigration and domestic public policy.
300 $a 137 p.
500 $a Adviser: Michael J. Boskin.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-06, Section: A, page: 2570.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2007.
520 $a This dissertation is concerned with illegal and legal immigration and domestic public policy. Chapter 1 presents institutional and political history at federal and state levels. Chapter 2 asks to what extent geographic clustering in U.S. border states is attributable to differences in state-provided public aid. California, has been shown to have a disproportionate number of legal immigrant welfare users, but little evidence exists concerning illegal persons. Illegal immigrants may collect welfare benefits on behalf of legal children or by using false documents, and legal status verification is often unnecessary for education or public medical services. Evidence from a nationally-representative farmworker survey featuring direct legal status data does not support welfare migration for any immigrant group. Conversely, U.S. Census data on immigrants in industries with lower illegal concentrations are consistent with welfare migration, even after the 1996 federal welfare reform. Chapter 3 examines if and how state-level labor market, agricultural, demographic, and public policy characteristics persuade or dissuade illegal and legal farmworker migration from Mexico. Results indicate that, consistent with social capital literature, personal and community networks are primary determinants of locational choices. Conversely, border enforcement significantly deters migration to certain areas. Results are strongest for California migrants and for experienced migrants relative to new ones. Chapter 4 hypothesizes how a new program granting amnesty to illegal immigrant farmworkers present in the U.S. would affect agricultural labor markets. Earnings differentials between illegal and legal workers, decomposed by hourly-equivalent wages and hours worked, as well as public aid program participation decisions, are studied. Illegal immigrants are shown to make three to five percent less in hourly wages, to work one to two fewer hours per week, and to have less than a five percent lower probability of program participation than their legal immigrant counterparts. Differentials are smaller for Californian workers. The analysis suggests that a new legalization program would likely have minimal effects on the earnings of currently illegal agricultural workers. An extension argues that if employers pass-through labor cost increases to consumers via food prices, the implicit tax rate on agricultural products would be similarly minimal.
590 $a School code: 0212.
650 4 $a Economics, Agricultural. $3 626648
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Economics, Labor. $3 1019135
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0503
690 $a 0510
710 2 $a Stanford University. $3 754827
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 68-06A.
790 $a 0212
790 1 0 $a Boskin, Michael J., $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2007
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3267598