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Essays in collective action.

Siegel, David A.

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Essays in collective action.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays in collective action./
Author:	Siegel, David A.
Description:	189 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Jonathan Bendor.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-05A.
Subject:	Political Science, General. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3219381
ISBN:	9780542708152

Essays in collective action.
Siegel, David A.

Essays in collective action. - 189 p.

Adviser: Jonathan Bendor.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2006.

This dissertation undertakes a theoretical study in the provision of collective action when the information structure is messy, costs and benefits for participation are unclear or subjective, and individuals are heterogeneous in belief and action. The first and second chapters after the introduction take a general look at collective behavior, including anything from protests, rebellion, or voting to fads or innovation adoption. The focus of these chapters is on fundamentally interdependent behavior, in which the more people who participate in some activity, the more likely non-participants are to join in as well, all else being equal. In the first chapter I explore the effects of both detailed social networks and an idealized mass media on participation in a collective action, utilizing a simulation to probe a model containing heterogeneous agents. I find that network connectivity and media involvement can either increase or decrease participation, depending on the underlying makeup of the population. In the second chapter I add the possibility of violent and non-violent repression to this model, illustrate the ways in which network structure and elite interests interact with the technologies of repression to yield participatory outcomes, and apply the model to Shi'ite voting in the January 2005 Iraqi legislative elections.

ISBN: 9780542708152Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017391
Political Science, General.

Essays in collective action.
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020 $a 9780542708152
035 $a (UMI)AAI3219381
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040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Siegel, David A. $3 694270
245 1 0 $a Essays in collective action.
300 $a 189 p.
500 $a Adviser: Jonathan Bendor.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-05, Section: A, page: 1902.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2006.
520 $a This dissertation undertakes a theoretical study in the provision of collective action when the information structure is messy, costs and benefits for participation are unclear or subjective, and individuals are heterogeneous in belief and action. The first and second chapters after the introduction take a general look at collective behavior, including anything from protests, rebellion, or voting to fads or innovation adoption. The focus of these chapters is on fundamentally interdependent behavior, in which the more people who participate in some activity, the more likely non-participants are to join in as well, all else being equal. In the first chapter I explore the effects of both detailed social networks and an idealized mass media on participation in a collective action, utilizing a simulation to probe a model containing heterogeneous agents. I find that network connectivity and media involvement can either increase or decrease participation, depending on the underlying makeup of the population. In the second chapter I add the possibility of violent and non-violent repression to this model, illustrate the ways in which network structure and elite interests interact with the technologies of repression to yield participatory outcomes, and apply the model to Shi'ite voting in the January 2005 Iraqi legislative elections.
520 $a The last two chapters focus more narrowly on mass voting behavior, and work from the assumption that each individual's decision-making is governed by retrospection: a comparison of an observed outcome to some internal standard. In the third chapter, we formalize a notion of retrospective voting, and derive voting outcomes both on the individual and on the group level, showing that individuals may develop partisan tendencies, despite lacking overt political ideologies, even when they misperceive outcomes. In the fourth chapter, we add myopically rational parties to the population of retrospective voters, and show how an endogenous incumbency advantage brought about by voter retrospection can lead a party to long stretches in office during which both parties locate away from both median and mean.
590 $a School code: 0212.
650 4 $a Political Science, General. $3 1017391
650 4 $a Sociology, Theory and Methods. $3 626625
690 $a 0344
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710 2 $a Stanford University. $3 754827
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 67-05A.
790 $a 0212
790 1 0 $a Bendor, Jonathan, $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2006
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3219381