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From behemoths to subsidiaries: The ...

Sznajder, Aleksandra Joanna.

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From behemoths to subsidiaries: The politics of steel sector restructuring and privatization in Central and Eastern Europe.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	From behemoths to subsidiaries: The politics of steel sector restructuring and privatization in Central and Eastern Europe./
Author:	Sznajder, Aleksandra Joanna.
Description:	504 p.
Notes:	Adviser: David R. Cameron.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-12A.
Subject:	Political Science, General. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3243709
ISBN:	9780542996030

From behemoths to subsidiaries: The politics of steel sector restructuring and privatization in Central and Eastern Europe.
Sznajder, Aleksandra Joanna.

From behemoths to subsidiaries: The politics of steel sector restructuring and privatization in Central and Eastern Europe. - 504 p.

Adviser: David R. Cameron.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2006.

I propose the theory of evolutionary state retrenchment as a contribution to two debates central to economic reform in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The first pertains to the kind of capitalism emerging in CEE and asks whether it is of one or of several varieties. The second concerns the means of creating liberal capitalism and the role of the managers, the labor unions, and the state. I use empirical puzzles in the steel sector of most different CEE countries: the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia to pursue an alternative explanation, which I derive from process-tracing the evolution of the pattern of ownership and restructuring in these countries.

ISBN: 9780542996030Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017391
Political Science, General.

From behemoths to subsidiaries: The politics of steel sector restructuring and privatization in Central and Eastern Europe.
LDR:03456nam 2200325 a 45 001 954174
005 20110621
008 110622s2006 eng d
020 $a 9780542996030
035 $a (UMI)AAI3243709
035 $a AAI3243709
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Sznajder, Aleksandra Joanna. $3 1277649
245 1 0 $a From behemoths to subsidiaries: The politics of steel sector restructuring and privatization in Central and Eastern Europe.
300 $a 504 p.
500 $a Adviser: David R. Cameron.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-12, Section: A, page: 4688.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2006.
520 $a I propose the theory of evolutionary state retrenchment as a contribution to two debates central to economic reform in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The first pertains to the kind of capitalism emerging in CEE and asks whether it is of one or of several varieties. The second concerns the means of creating liberal capitalism and the role of the managers, the labor unions, and the state. I use empirical puzzles in the steel sector of most different CEE countries: the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia to pursue an alternative explanation, which I derive from process-tracing the evolution of the pattern of ownership and restructuring in these countries.
520 $a The theory accounts for the initial divergence in the type of emerging capitalism and for its eventual convergence. The process is evolutionary because the outcomes vindicate teleological arguments about the evolution towards liberal capitalism and because, in line with the insights of the "legacies" literature, they are rooted in the domestic political conditions, which shape the converging trajectories.
520 $a The argument is that the countries started the transition process with diverse structures of political competition, i.e., coalitions differing in their ideological proclivities, cohesion, and strength of political opposition. Acting under sectoral pressures, the coalitions balanced ideological goals with reelection concerns and with rent-seeking opportunities. The initial policy decisions resulted in politically-convenient partial reform, i.e., in privatization to domestic owners or in continued state ownership, neither of which ensured viability on world markets. Policy feedback, mediated by varying levels of state technocratic capacity, triggered different external pressures in these countries, creating convergence on ownership by strategic foreign investors. Counterintuitively, states with higher level of technocratic capacity retained partial reform outcomes longer.
520 $a In contribution to the second debate, I argue that strong, autonomous sectoral union organizations are conducive to effective restructuring. This cannot be said of managerial networks since the managers are prestige-maximizers, engaging in myopic restructuring strategies. Finally, the state has an irreplaceable role to play, but it is not the developmental state version, in part because the goal of economic development is achieved through active state preparation of its subsequent retrenchment.
590 $a School code: 0265.
650 4 $a Political Science, General. $3 1017391
650 4 $a Sociology, Industrial and Labor Relations. $3 1017858
650 4 $a Sociology, Organizational. $3 1018023
690 $a 0615
690 $a 0629
690 $a 0703
710 2 $a Yale University. $3 515640
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 67-12A.
790 $a 0265
790 1 0 $a Cameron, David R., $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2006
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3243709