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The phenomenon of amoralism: An inve...

Zavaliy, Andrei G.

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The phenomenon of amoralism: An investigation of the cognitive and emotive roots.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The phenomenon of amoralism: An investigation of the cognitive and emotive roots./
作者:	Zavaliy, Andrei G.
面頁冊數:	250 p.
附註:	Adviser: Douglas P. Lackey.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International69-01A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3296921
ISBN:	9780549434030

The phenomenon of amoralism: An investigation of the cognitive and emotive roots.
Zavaliy, Andrei G.

The phenomenon of amoralism: An investigation of the cognitive and emotive roots. - 250 p.

Adviser: Douglas P. Lackey.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--City University of New York, 2008.

An amoralist is defined as a person who rejects the claims of moral reasons to special authority, and systematically acts without regard to the generally accepted moral standards. A psychopath can be seen as a paradigm case of an extreme amoralist, although the less severe cases of selective amoralists are considered. The research into the typical behavioral pattern, motivational structure, and the value system of psychopaths can shed light on at least three aspects related to the analysis of the moral agency. First, it can help elucidating the emotive and cognitive conditions necessary for moral performance. Secondly, it can provide empirical evidence supporting the externalist theories of moral motivation. Finally, it can bring into greater focus our intuitive notion of the limits of moral responsibility. In this work I concentrate on the first and the last aspects, but the discussion has an indirect bearing on the second theme as well.

ISBN: 9780549434030Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

The phenomenon of amoralism: An investigation of the cognitive and emotive roots.
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245 1 4 $a The phenomenon of amoralism: An investigation of the cognitive and emotive roots.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-01, Section: A, page: 0243.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--City University of New York, 2008.
520 $a An amoralist is defined as a person who rejects the claims of moral reasons to special authority, and systematically acts without regard to the generally accepted moral standards. A psychopath can be seen as a paradigm case of an extreme amoralist, although the less severe cases of selective amoralists are considered. The research into the typical behavioral pattern, motivational structure, and the value system of psychopaths can shed light on at least three aspects related to the analysis of the moral agency. First, it can help elucidating the emotive and cognitive conditions necessary for moral performance. Secondly, it can provide empirical evidence supporting the externalist theories of moral motivation. Finally, it can bring into greater focus our intuitive notion of the limits of moral responsibility. In this work I concentrate on the first and the last aspects, but the discussion has an indirect bearing on the second theme as well.
520 $a The phenomenon of amoralism presents a challenge: the psychopaths are not usually diagnosed as psychotic, and yet there is a sense in which their condition is clearly abnormal and needs explaining. The main purpose of this work is to specify the typical features of amoral individuals and point to the roots of this abnormality. The two explanatory options are considered: the amoralist may suffer either from emotive deficiency, or else exhibit a cognitive failure of some sort. The comparison of amoralists with autistic individuals allows dismissing the emotive deficiency as the main reason of the amoral condition, and an argument is developed to show that a fundamental mistake in judgments about good and evil is ultimately responsible for this condition.
520 $a The amoralists, however, can be held morally responsible for their actions. I seek to show that certain arguments that encourage us to see the psychopath as a badly wired machine that is exempt from responsibility are wrong. Finally, it is argued that the libertarian interpretation of a free choice puts an important constraint on our ability to explain the basis of one's decision to adopt a set of values incompatible with the essential values of the moral point of view.
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