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Incomplete property rights and natur...
~
Kaffine, Daniel Thomas.
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Incomplete property rights and natural resource use.
Record Type:
Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:
Incomplete property rights and natural resource use./
Author:
Kaffine, Daniel Thomas.
Description:
138 p.
Notes:
Adviser: Christopher Costello.
Contained By:
Dissertation Abstracts International68-10B.
Subject:
Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquaculture. -
Online resource:
http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3283761
ISBN:
9780549269915
Incomplete property rights and natural resource use.
Kaffine, Daniel Thomas.
Incomplete property rights and natural resource use.
- 138 p.
Adviser: Christopher Costello.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Santa Barbara, 2007.
For more than half a century, the critical importance of property rights and natural resources in regards to economic and environmental outcomes has been known, and yet, full and complete property rights for natural resources are rarely observed. Economists typically have considered the implications of no ownership (open access) and full ownership (sole owner), but in reality, many natural resources lie somewhere between those two extremes.
ISBN: 9780549269915Subjects--Topical Terms:
1020913
Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquaculture.
Incomplete property rights and natural resource use.
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Incomplete property rights and natural resource use.
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138 p.
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Adviser: Christopher Costello.
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Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-10, Section: B, page: 6562.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Santa Barbara, 2007.
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For more than half a century, the critical importance of property rights and natural resources in regards to economic and environmental outcomes has been known, and yet, full and complete property rights for natural resources are rarely observed. Economists typically have considered the implications of no ownership (open access) and full ownership (sole owner), but in reality, many natural resources lie somewhere between those two extremes.
520
$a
This dissertation considers how less than complete property rights influence incentives to use natural resources. Is economic efficiency possible under limited-tenure property rights? What are the efficiency impacts of spatially defined property rights? When users create and enforce their own property rights, does the quality of the resource influence the strength of those rights?
520
$a
It is shown that, under the proper incentives, economically efficient harvest can occur even under limited-tenure property rights. The theoretical insights of this paper are extended to an empirical example focusing on fisheries in Baja California, Mexico, which finds that the twenty-year concessions currently in place may be sufficient to encourage stewardship for fast-growing spiny lobster, but not for the slow-growth abalone. When property rights are spatially defined, large decreases in efficiency are likely under uncoordinated harvest decisions when systems are characterized by large dispersal across owner boundaries.
520
$a
When owners coordinate their efforts, through profit sharing for example, economic efficiency can be achieved, provided cooperation is a supportable equilibrium. Finally, when users enforce their own informal property rights, conditions are derived under which higher-quality resources increase attempts by users to close the commons by excluding others. Empirically examining Californian surf breaks shows that a 10% increase in the quality of the resource leads to a 13% increase in the strength of property rights.
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School code: 0035.
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advisor
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committee member
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http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3283761
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W9114527
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11.線上閱覽_V
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EB W9114527
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