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How Russian industry works: Worker ...

Southworth, Caleb John.

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How Russian industry works: Worker and firm survival strategies in six enterprises in Bashkortostan.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	How Russian industry works: Worker and firm survival strategies in six enterprises in Bashkortostan./
作者:	Southworth, Caleb John.
面頁冊數:	292 p.
附註:	Chair: Ivan Szelenyi.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International61-12A.
標題:	Economics, Labor. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9999026
ISBN:	9780493075556

How Russian industry works: Worker and firm survival strategies in six enterprises in Bashkortostan.
Southworth, Caleb John.

How Russian industry works: Worker and firm survival strategies in six enterprises in Bashkortostan. - 292 p.

Chair: Ivan Szelenyi.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2001.

How are large Russian enterprises able to produce goods without regular payment of wages? Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, how has industrial production been organized without planning ministries and the Communist Party? This study proposes that enterprises developed a new type of authority relationship with their workers called "post-Soviet neo-paternalism." Ethnographic, participant observation, and survey methods are employed in six enterprises in the Russian Republic of Bashkortostan. Two brick factories, a machine tool factory, a milk processing plant, a power generating facility and a transportation cooperative are compared. Factories in Russia are neopaternalistic because the director's personal authority organizes work through distribution of social welfare, and workers grow part of their own food. Neo-paternalism evolved as many enterprises were bankrupt and lacked the cash to meet their wage bills or purchase raw materials. Rather than close their doors, directors sought to establish barter relationships with suppliers, utility companies, and municipalities. These barter chains allowed them to take responsibility for food, housing, and other basic needs of their workforce. Neo-paternalism better explains economic outcomes for enterprises than theories that consider Russia a market economy or that argue for a holdover of institutions from the USSR. The market economy approach fails to explain the lack of innovation and new products, the aversion to downsizing and continued hiring of workers, and the lack of market prices for goods and labor. The holdover approach does not account for the survival of some traditions and not others, the new expansion of welfare benefits while traditional ones are eliminated, and the increased responsibility of the firm for social welfare, which was met through cash payments during Soviet times. Neo-paternalism differs from Walder's (1986) "communist neo-traditionalism" in that the communist party and state do riot play central roles in economic integration; it differs from Kornai's (1980) description of state paternalism in that the location of paternalistic exchange moved from state-enterprise to workforce-enterprise.

ISBN: 9780493075556Subjects--Topical Terms:

1019135
Economics, Labor.

How Russian industry works: Worker and firm survival strategies in six enterprises in Bashkortostan.
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