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Essays on the theory of organization...

Severinov, Sergei L.

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Essays on the theory of organization and information transmission.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on the theory of organization and information transmission./
作者:	Severinov, Sergei L.
面頁冊數:	186 p.
附註:	Adviser: B. Douglas Bernheim.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International59-10A.
標題:	Economics, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9908846
ISBN:	9780599070028

Essays on the theory of organization and information transmission.
Severinov, Sergei L.

Essays on the theory of organization and information transmission. - 186 p.

Adviser: B. Douglas Bernheim.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 1998.

The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to our understanding of two related areas of economics. The first is the effects of an outside environment on the optimal structure of firms and organizations, their efficiency and contractual relations within them. The second is the methods and the strategic use of information transmission by different economic actors in markets and in non-market contexts.

ISBN: 9780599070028Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Essays on the theory of organization and information transmission.
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502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 1998.
520 $a The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to our understanding of two related areas of economics. The first is the effects of an outside environment on the optimal structure of firms and organizations, their efficiency and contractual relations within them. The second is the methods and the strategic use of information transmission by different economic actors in markets and in non-market contexts.
520 $a In chapter 2 I study the link between the market demand and the optimal structure of an organization engaged in production of multiple goods. I explore how the nature of the demand for the final products affects the firm's decision to centralize or decentralize production or procurement.
520 $a In chapter 3 I undertake a theoretical analysis of the informal exchange of technological information between employees of different firms engaged in the R&D process. I study the conditions under which this exchange occurs and does not occur, and characterize the optimal contracts which firms can use to control their employees' efforts and information flows between them. I show how the nature of the firms' interaction in the product market affects the compensation schemes offered to the employees and the intensity of the information exchange that employees engage in.
520 $a Chapter 4 deals with the issue of influence activities within organizations. It is well-known that employees of hierarchical organizations usually spend part of their time unproductively in activities aimed at influencing managers' positive discretion. I investigate how the employees' optimal time allocation between productive activities and influence activities is affected by the existence of an external labor market and the availability of information about employees outside of their firms. I demonstrate how the employees' optimal time allocation depends on the size of this outside labor market and the intensity of competition in it.
520 $a Chapter 5 reexamines the role of prices as signals of quality in a dynamic framework where uncertainty is resolved gradually. This approach allows me to endogenize the size and the origin of the pool of informed consumers. The chapter demonstrates that in situations of this type a high-quality firm will set a lower introductory price, because such a firm is more likely to survive until the next period, and therefore is more willing to sacrifice current profits for an increase in the pool of informed consumers in the next period.
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