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Intra-state conflict as a cause for ...

Karaman, Kamil Kivanc.

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Intra-state conflict as a cause for undertaxation and underdevelopment.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Intra-state conflict as a cause for undertaxation and underdevelopment./
作者:	Karaman, Kamil Kivanc.
面頁冊數:	120 p.
附註:	Adviser: Avner Greif.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International69-02A.
標題:	Economics, History. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3302838
ISBN:	9780549489955

Intra-state conflict as a cause for undertaxation and underdevelopment.
Karaman, Kamil Kivanc.

Intra-state conflict as a cause for undertaxation and underdevelopment. - 120 p.

Adviser: Avner Greif.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2008.

In certain polities, the nature of the state can best be captured as a contract whereby the central administration delegates taxation in the countryside to provincial elites. More specifically, due to technological necessities, the center relies on delegates to exact taxes, and shares the resulting gross tax revenue with them. What complicates the relationship is the fact that, since both the center and the delegates have access to coercive force, there is no third part to enforce the ex-ante contracts on how to share the revenue. Rather, the sharing rule depends on the relative bargaining powers after the taxes are raised.

ISBN: 9780549489955Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017418
Economics, History.

Intra-state conflict as a cause for undertaxation and underdevelopment.
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100 1 $a Karaman, Kamil Kivanc. $3 1266297
245 1 0 $a Intra-state conflict as a cause for undertaxation and underdevelopment.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-02, Section: A, page: 0702.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2008.
520 $a In certain polities, the nature of the state can best be captured as a contract whereby the central administration delegates taxation in the countryside to provincial elites. More specifically, due to technological necessities, the center relies on delegates to exact taxes, and shares the resulting gross tax revenue with them. What complicates the relationship is the fact that, since both the center and the delegates have access to coercive force, there is no third part to enforce the ex-ante contracts on how to share the revenue. Rather, the sharing rule depends on the relative bargaining powers after the taxes are raised.
520 $a The dissertation investigates the implications of the contractual problem utilizing empirical evidence from the Ottoman Empire interactively with game-theoretic analysis. The Ottoman lunar system, a well-documented example of the generic contractual pattern, motivates the theoretical model. The model, in turn, identifies the trade-off the center faces in setting the provincial tax rate: while the concern to maximize the gross tax revenue induces a high rate, the fact that the center is engaged in a redistributive conflict with provincial delegates induces a low one. The key contribution of the dissertation is to identify the conditions for " Undertaxation Equilibrium", where the second concern prevails and the center caps provincial exaction below the maximum feasible.
520 $a With respect to economic development, the model and historical evidence identify a mechanism through which the contractual problem distorts state's incentive. If the redistributive concern prevails, the state does not internalize marginal increases in provincial economic activity, and has no incentive to adopt costly policies to foster it. The prediction is consistent with Ottoman administration's policy of transferring economic resources from the countryside to the political center.
520 $a The extension of the theoretical model to an imperfect information setup, and the evidence on Ottoman legal system point to the primary role the centralized judiciary played in monitoring provincial taxation. In particular, through publicizing the tax rate and the history of punishments, the administration credibly committed to punishing abusive delegates. Tracing the historical precedents for the administrative practices points to continuity with predecessor states in the Middle East.
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