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Case studies in the economics of dom...

Shimshack, Jay P.

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Case studies in the economics of domestic water quality.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Case studies in the economics of domestic water quality./
作者:	Shimshack, Jay P.
面頁冊數:	107 p.
附註:	Chair: Jeffrey T. LaFrance.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International63-09A.
標題:	Economics, Agricultural. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3063546
ISBN:	0493824391

Case studies in the economics of domestic water quality.
Shimshack, Jay P.

Case studies in the economics of domestic water quality. - 107 p.

Chair: Jeffrey T. LaFrance.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2002.

This dissertation examines case studies in the economics of domestic water quality. To motivate the analysis, the first chapter begins by characterizing water systems and their complexity. The work discusses the state of U.S. waterways, and common types and sources of impairment are closely examined. The chapter concludes by reviewing the legislation that governs the management of water quality. Particular attention is given to early laws, regulating point sources, managing non-point source pollution, and specialized legislation.

ISBN: 0493824391Subjects--Topical Terms:

626648
Economics, Agricultural.

Case studies in the economics of domestic water quality.
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245 1 0 $a Case studies in the economics of domestic water quality.
300 $a 107 p.
500 $a Chair: Jeffrey T. LaFrance.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 63-09, Section: A, page: 3284.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2002.
520 $a This dissertation examines case studies in the economics of domestic water quality. To motivate the analysis, the first chapter begins by characterizing water systems and their complexity. The work discusses the state of U.S. waterways, and common types and sources of impairment are closely examined. The chapter concludes by reviewing the legislation that governs the management of water quality. Particular attention is given to early laws, regulating point sources, managing non-point source pollution, and specialized legislation.
520 $a One of the primary conclusions from the first chapter is that point-source regulation has been successful relative to non-point source management, primarily because point-source programs are enforceable. The relative effectiveness of specific regulatory instruments, however, is not well understood. The second chapter therefore asks three key questions about the impact of environmental enforcement strategies. First, how effective are fines and other sanctions at inducing environmental compliance? Second, how much do inspections contribute to compliance on the margin? And third, how reliable are monitoring strategies based upon firms' self-reported emissions? We find the following answers: Fines significantly reduce effluent violations. The impact of less severe intermediate enforcement actions is substantially less than that of fines. Inspections weakly induce additional compliance at the margin. Finally, our data provide no evidence that firms strategically misreport effluent levels.
520 $a Non-point source emissions, such as those from agriculture, are not subject to enforceable regulation in the United States. As a result, government policies that encourage cropland expansion may be detrimental to the nation's water quality. Consequently, the third chapter examines the relationship between crop insurance programs and expansion on the extensive margin of agricultural production. A partial equilibrium model of stochastic crop production demonstrates that land use is unchanged (relative to no insurance) only when an actuarially fair separating contract is offered. Separation must occur across land qualities. For actuarially fair, pooling equilibrium contracts, however, land with a minimum quality that is strictly lower than the minimum quality without insurance will be added to production. Premium subsidies, regardless of equilibrium type, create (further) incentives for expansion on the extensive margin.
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