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Repeated auctions, the right of firs...

Chouinard, Hayley Helene.

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Repeated auctions, the right of first refusal, and the National Park Service.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Repeated auctions, the right of first refusal, and the National Park Service./
作者:	Chouinard, Hayley Helene.
面頁冊數:	87 p.
附註:	Chairs: Jeffrey M. Perloff; Michael B. Ward.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International63-09A.
標題:	Economics, Agricultural. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3063326
ISBN:	0493821864

Repeated auctions, the right of first refusal, and the National Park Service.
Chouinard, Hayley Helene.

Repeated auctions, the right of first refusal, and the National Park Service. - 87 p.

Chairs: Jeffrey M. Perloff; Michael B. Ward.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2002.

Auction rules describe the auction and dictate the bidders and their optimal bids. A rule which may greatly influence the outcome of auctions is the right of first refusal. An incumbent, the winner of the auction in the previous period, with the right of first refusal has the right to match the highest current bid. An incumbent with this right can choose to match all other bids and continually win subsequent auctions.

ISBN: 0493821864Subjects--Topical Terms:

626648
Economics, Agricultural.

Repeated auctions, the right of first refusal, and the National Park Service.
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035 $a (UnM)AAI3063326
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040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Chouinard, Hayley Helene. $3 1257465
245 1 0 $a Repeated auctions, the right of first refusal, and the National Park Service.
300 $a 87 p.
500 $a Chairs: Jeffrey M. Perloff; Michael B. Ward.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 63-09, Section: A, page: 3281.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2002.
520 $a Auction rules describe the auction and dictate the bidders and their optimal bids. A rule which may greatly influence the outcome of auctions is the right of first refusal. An incumbent, the winner of the auction in the previous period, with the right of first refusal has the right to match the highest current bid. An incumbent with this right can choose to match all other bids and continually win subsequent auctions.
520 $a The effects of including the right of first refusal in auctions is the focus of this work. The auctions modeled are used to examine the National Park Service concession contracts, as the Park Service uses both types of auctions. After an introductory chapter, Chapter 2 describes the National Park concession contracts. A history of the contracts is given followed by a description of the two types of current contracts.
520 $a To begin the analysis of the National Park concession contract auctions, one period auction models with and without the right of first refusal are presented in Chapter 3. The optimal bidding strategies, and expected payoff to the seller are compared. The payoff to the National Park Service will depend on the values held by the bidders. However, it is found that when the incumbent has a relatively high value for the concession right, the National Park Service will receive more service and/or payment with the auction without the right of first refusal.
520 $a A first price repeated auction with the right of first refusal and a second price repeated auction without the right are developed in Chapter 4. It is found that the auction without the right of first refusal will generate the same payoff for the National Park Service as the auction without the right of first refusal.
520 $a Chapter 5 contains an analysis of the robustness of the repeated auction with the right of first refusal examined previously. The limitation of two bidders, and the uniform cost distribution assumptions are relaxed. The results of these generalizations are then compared with the results of the original repeated auction with the right of first refusal. Conclusions are given in Chapter 6.
590 $a School code: 0028.
650 4 $a Economics, Agricultural. $3 626648
690 $a 0503
710 2 0 $a University of California, Berkeley. $3 687832
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 63-09A.
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790 1 0 $a Perloff, Jeffrey M., $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Ward, Michael B., $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2002
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3063326