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Essays on moral hazard (India).

Braido, Luis Henrique Bertolino.

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Essays on moral hazard (India).

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on moral hazard (India)./
Author:	Braido, Luis Henrique Bertolino.
Description:	77 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Pierre-Andre Chiappori.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International63-07A.
Subject:	Economics, Agricultural. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3060710
ISBN:	0493760032

Essays on moral hazard (India).
Braido, Luis Henrique Bertolino.

Essays on moral hazard (India). - 77 p.

Adviser: Pierre-Andre Chiappori.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2002.

This thesis is composed of two articles that contribute to the literature on moral hazard. The first article models a general equilibrium economy with moral hazard and endogenous financial markets. The model allows any individual to open a clearinghouse and issue competitive securities. Issuers have some control over trades in their clearinghouses, but do not observe transactions in the securities issued by others. Typically, the equilibrium presents endogenously incomplete financial markets. The second article uses tenancy data from India to study a classical example of moral hazard: the landlord-tenant relationship. I propose a test methodology that distinguishes between hidden and non-monitored actions. Sharecropping and fixed-rent tenants are found equally productive, but less productive than owners. Tenants crop lower-quality lands and use less of other inputs. Controlling for observable inputs, the contract form has no effect on the expected output. Next, I test if sharecroppers' input choices respect profit-maximization conditions. The evidence does not support the existence of missing incentives.

ISBN: 0493760032Subjects--Topical Terms:

626648
Economics, Agricultural.

Essays on moral hazard (India).
LDR:01970nam 2200277 a 45 001 933724
005 20110506
008 110506s2002 eng d
020 $a 0493760032
035 $a (UnM)AAI3060710
035 $a AAI3060710
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Braido, Luis Henrique Bertolino. $3 1257455
245 1 0 $a Essays on moral hazard (India).
300 $a 77 p.
500 $a Adviser: Pierre-Andre Chiappori.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 63-07, Section: A, page: 2627.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2002.
520 $a This thesis is composed of two articles that contribute to the literature on moral hazard. The first article models a general equilibrium economy with moral hazard and endogenous financial markets. The model allows any individual to open a clearinghouse and issue competitive securities. Issuers have some control over trades in their clearinghouses, but do not observe transactions in the securities issued by others. Typically, the equilibrium presents endogenously incomplete financial markets. The second article uses tenancy data from India to study a classical example of moral hazard: the landlord-tenant relationship. I propose a test methodology that distinguishes between hidden and non-monitored actions. Sharecropping and fixed-rent tenants are found equally productive, but less productive than owners. Tenants crop lower-quality lands and use less of other inputs. Controlling for observable inputs, the contract form has no effect on the expected output. Next, I test if sharecroppers' input choices respect profit-maximization conditions. The evidence does not support the existence of missing incentives.
590 $a School code: 0330.
650 4 $a Economics, Agricultural. $3 626648
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0503
710 2 0 $a The University of Chicago. $3 1017389
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 63-07A.
790 $a 0330
790 1 0 $a Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2002
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3060710