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Three essays in public policy (Immun...

Mechoulan, Stephane Fabrice.

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Three essays in public policy (Immune deficiency).

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Three essays in public policy (Immune deficiency)./
作者:	Mechoulan, Stephane Fabrice.
面頁冊數:	181 p.
附註:	Adviser: Joseph Altonji.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International62-11A.
標題:	Economics, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3033534
ISBN:	0493459537

Three essays in public policy (Immune deficiency).
Mechoulan, Stephane Fabrice.

Three essays in public policy (Immune deficiency). - 181 p.

Adviser: Joseph Altonji.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2001.

This dissertation studies different forms of externalities in the fields of health economics and family economics. The first chapter deals with HIV testing. The consequences of disclosing HIV status are unclear. Infected individuals, assuming they behave selfishly, would tend to increase their number of partners. Meanwhile, non-infected ones would decrease theirs. The net effect on the equilibrium level of infection is thus uncertain. In a simple OLG model, simulations suggest that the disclosure of HIV status can spur a higher prevalence and reduce welfare. I study which modifications from the benchmark case are necessary to offset the negative effect. Finally, I show that a planner might use the test results to organize transfers between infected and non-infected individuals, leading to a Pareto improvement and theoretically, disease eradication. The second chapter investigates the impact of divorce laws on marriage and divorce in the United States. I propose a theory that captures the key facts of rising then declining divorce rates and the apparent convergence of those divorce rates across the different divorce regimes. The empirical results suggest that a shift from fault to no fault divorce increases the odds of divorcing for those couples who married before the shift. Those couples who marry after the shift to no fault, in turn, sort themselves better at marriage, which offsets the direct effect of the law on divorce rates. As implied by the same selectivity argument, after a switch to no fault divorce, spouses marry later, while those who divorce remarry less quickly. These results hold for the law governing property settlement and alimony, which seems to matter more than the law for grounds. The third chapter discusses optimal strategies for a firm and for a planner under different scenarios involving infectious diseases. A dynamic framework with heterogeneous agents is used. This work addresses both the cases of antibiotics and vaccines. The results make a strong argument for policy making, with a focus on prices and patent design.

ISBN: 0493459537Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Three essays in public policy (Immune deficiency).
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520 $a This dissertation studies different forms of externalities in the fields of health economics and family economics. The first chapter deals with HIV testing. The consequences of disclosing HIV status are unclear. Infected individuals, assuming they behave selfishly, would tend to increase their number of partners. Meanwhile, non-infected ones would decrease theirs. The net effect on the equilibrium level of infection is thus uncertain. In a simple OLG model, simulations suggest that the disclosure of HIV status can spur a higher prevalence and reduce welfare. I study which modifications from the benchmark case are necessary to offset the negative effect. Finally, I show that a planner might use the test results to organize transfers between infected and non-infected individuals, leading to a Pareto improvement and theoretically, disease eradication. The second chapter investigates the impact of divorce laws on marriage and divorce in the United States. I propose a theory that captures the key facts of rising then declining divorce rates and the apparent convergence of those divorce rates across the different divorce regimes. The empirical results suggest that a shift from fault to no fault divorce increases the odds of divorcing for those couples who married before the shift. Those couples who marry after the shift to no fault, in turn, sort themselves better at marriage, which offsets the direct effect of the law on divorce rates. As implied by the same selectivity argument, after a switch to no fault divorce, spouses marry later, while those who divorce remarry less quickly. These results hold for the law governing property settlement and alimony, which seems to matter more than the law for grounds. The third chapter discusses optimal strategies for a firm and for a planner under different scenarios involving infectious diseases. A dynamic framework with heterogeneous agents is used. This work addresses both the cases of antibiotics and vaccines. The results make a strong argument for policy making, with a focus on prices and patent design.
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