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Environmental dispute and mediated b...

Yu, Shuoe-Yien.

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Environmental dispute and mediated bargaining in Taiwan (China).

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Environmental dispute and mediated bargaining in Taiwan (China)./
作者:	Yu, Shuoe-Yien.
面頁冊數:	148 p.
附註:	Chair: Jeff A. Krautkraemer.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International62-08A.
標題:	Economics, Agricultural. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3023619
ISBN:	0493353763

Environmental dispute and mediated bargaining in Taiwan (China).
Yu, Shuoe-Yien.

Environmental dispute and mediated bargaining in Taiwan (China). - 148 p.

Chair: Jeff A. Krautkraemer.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Washington State University, 2001.

In Taiwan, the Public Dispute Settlement Act of 1992 stipulates that the victims whose human health and property value are damaged by pollution of the neighboring source can petition a mediation committee. The committee invites the disputants to a meeting to bargain over the amount of compensation. Since the victims want to use occurrence of the dispute to acquire the liable firm's financial assistance and worry that mediated negotiation may be broken by the firm, the victims could threaten the firm by lobbying the local parliamentarians to put political pressures on the firm. This could cause the two disputants to reach an agreement indicating a monetary award that consists of compensation for damages and additional fund that can be used for other community's purposes. What factors determine a monetary award? Does the source reduce the level of emissions in anticipation of this payment? Do the victims expect this benefit and then undertake petition activity and enhance its lobbying effort? These issues will be examined in this study. To analyze these issues, we develop a three-stage two-person game theoretic model.

ISBN: 0493353763Subjects--Topical Terms:

626648
Economics, Agricultural.

Environmental dispute and mediated bargaining in Taiwan (China).
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245 1 0 $a Environmental dispute and mediated bargaining in Taiwan (China).
300 $a 148 p.
500 $a Chair: Jeff A. Krautkraemer.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 62-08, Section: A, page: 2842.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Washington State University, 2001.
520 $a In Taiwan, the Public Dispute Settlement Act of 1992 stipulates that the victims whose human health and property value are damaged by pollution of the neighboring source can petition a mediation committee. The committee invites the disputants to a meeting to bargain over the amount of compensation. Since the victims want to use occurrence of the dispute to acquire the liable firm's financial assistance and worry that mediated negotiation may be broken by the firm, the victims could threaten the firm by lobbying the local parliamentarians to put political pressures on the firm. This could cause the two disputants to reach an agreement indicating a monetary award that consists of compensation for damages and additional fund that can be used for other community's purposes. What factors determine a monetary award? Does the source reduce the level of emissions in anticipation of this payment? Do the victims expect this benefit and then undertake petition activity and enhance its lobbying effort? These issues will be examined in this study. To analyze these issues, we develop a three-stage two-person game theoretic model.
520 $a Our objective is to examine the role the mediated negotiation plays in the firm's and the community's decision-making processes. Results show that four reasons could be used to explain why the community might not undertake petition activity or lobbying efforts: (i) the fixed cost of petition activity is large; (ii) natural dilution of emissions is great; (iii) the firm's abatement technology is improved; (iv) the firm's outlay for split in negotiation is reduced. The polluting firm does reduce emissions when it knows that the community will undertake petition activity. To control environmental quality and relieve disputes, an environmental agency can stipulate a rule that states that an entrepreneur must have a contract with the neighboring residents before a factory begins operation and discharges harmful pollutants.
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