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CEO compensation in Japan.

Snider, Helen K.

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CEO compensation in Japan.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	CEO compensation in Japan./
作者:	Snider, Helen K.
面頁冊數:	59 p.
附註:	Adviser: George Sorter.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International61-12A.
標題:	Business Administration, Accounting. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9999224
ISBN:	0493072381

CEO compensation in Japan.
Snider, Helen K.

CEO compensation in Japan. - 59 p.

Adviser: George Sorter.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, Graduate School of Business Administration, 2001.

The pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation in Japan is systematically associated with both firm characteristics and individual attributes as invoked from agency theory and human capital theory. The results indicate that continuous monitoring by the main bank and other member firms of the same business group contributes to aligning the interests of Japanese CEOs with those of outside shareholders through an enhanced sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm performance. Furthermore, pay-performance sensitivity is greater for <italic> keiretsu</italic> firms with close ties to their main banks and other member firms. In addition, the CEO's tenure positively influences pay-performance sensitivity.

ISBN: 0493072381Subjects--Topical Terms:

1020666
Business Administration, Accounting.

CEO compensation in Japan.
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520 $a The pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation in Japan is systematically associated with both firm characteristics and individual attributes as invoked from agency theory and human capital theory. The results indicate that continuous monitoring by the main bank and other member firms of the same business group contributes to aligning the interests of Japanese CEOs with those of outside shareholders through an enhanced sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm performance. Furthermore, pay-performance sensitivity is greater for <italic> keiretsu</italic> firms with close ties to their main banks and other member firms. In addition, the CEO's tenure positively influences pay-performance sensitivity.
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