東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Information asymmetries, risk, and n...

Boucher, Stephen R.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Information asymmetries, risk, and non-price rationing: An exploration of rural credit markets in northern Peru.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Information asymmetries, risk, and non-price rationing: An exploration of rural credit markets in northern Peru./
作者:	Boucher, Stephen R.
面頁冊數:	276 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 61-08, Section: A, page: 3263.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International61-08A.
標題:	Economics, Agricultural. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9983786
ISBN:	0599901462

Information asymmetries, risk, and non-price rationing: An exploration of rural credit markets in northern Peru.
Boucher, Stephen R.

Information asymmetries, risk, and non-price rationing: An exploration of rural credit markets in northern Peru. - 276 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 61-08, Section: A, page: 3263.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2000.

This dissertation offers a conceptual and empirical exploration of how asymmetric information, risk preferences, and the distribution of wealth impact the structure and performance of rural credit markets. A model of contract design in the presence of moral hazard is developed in which a risk neutral lender offer contracts to a risk averse farmer who owns a potentially profitable investment project. The model gives rise to the potential for quantity rationing and an additional form of non-price rationing called <italic>risk rationing </italic>. Both quantity and risk rationed farmers would seek a credit contract in a first best—or symmetric information world—but end up without a contract when information is asymmetric. Whereas quantity rationed farmers are “involuntarily” excluded because they are not offered a contract, risk rationed farmers “voluntarily” withdraw from the market because the limited set of contracts that are available under asymmetric information imply too much risk. Like those that are quantity rationed, risk rationed farmers end up undertaking low risk, low return projects.

ISBN: 0599901462Subjects--Topical Terms:

626648
Economics, Agricultural.

Information asymmetries, risk, and non-price rationing: An exploration of rural credit markets in northern Peru.
LDR:03191nam 2200313 a 45 001 929243
005 20110427
008 110427s2000 eng d
020 $a 0599901462
035 $a (UnM)AAI9983786
035 $a AAI9983786
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Boucher, Stephen R. $3 1252728
245 1 0 $a Information asymmetries, risk, and non-price rationing: An exploration of rural credit markets in northern Peru.
300 $a 276 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 61-08, Section: A, page: 3263.
500 $a Supervisor: Michael Carter.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2000.
520 $a This dissertation offers a conceptual and empirical exploration of how asymmetric information, risk preferences, and the distribution of wealth impact the structure and performance of rural credit markets. A model of contract design in the presence of moral hazard is developed in which a risk neutral lender offer contracts to a risk averse farmer who owns a potentially profitable investment project. The model gives rise to the potential for quantity rationing and an additional form of non-price rationing called <italic>risk rationing </italic>. Both quantity and risk rationed farmers would seek a credit contract in a first best—or symmetric information world—but end up without a contract when information is asymmetric. Whereas quantity rationed farmers are “involuntarily” excluded because they are not offered a contract, risk rationed farmers “voluntarily” withdraw from the market because the limited set of contracts that are available under asymmetric information imply too much risk. Like those that are quantity rationed, risk rationed farmers end up undertaking low risk, low return projects.
520 $a The structure of the credit market depends on the distribution of endowments since both the terms of available contracts and the willingness of a farmer to accept a given contract are functions of the farmers' collateral wealth and liquidity. The theoretical analysis also highlights the potential role the credit market can play in providing insurance. The ability of the credit market to provide insurance is limited by asymmetric information since lenders seek to overcome problems of moral hazard by shifting downside risk to borrowers.
520 $a These issues are explored empirically using survey data collected from 550 farmers in northern Peru in 1997. The survey design permits the separate identification of risk rationed, quantity rationed, and price rationed farmers, Over half of the sample farmers were non-price rationed in the formal credit market, A multinomial logit analysis reveals patterns of endowment based credit rationing—in which poorer farmers are more likely to be non-price rationed—that are consistent with the theoretical model.
590 $a School code: 0262.
650 4 $a Economics, Agricultural. $3 626648
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0503
690 $a 0511
710 2 0 $a The University of Wisconsin - Madison. $3 626640
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 61-08A.
790 $a 0262
790 1 0 $a Carter, Michael, $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2000
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9983786