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An identity theory of truth

Dodd, Julian.

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An identity theory of truth

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	An identity theory of truth/ Julian Dodd.
作者:	Dodd, Julian.
出版者:	Basingstoke :Palgrave Macmillan, : c2008.,
面頁冊數:	xi, 200 p.
附註:	"First published in paperback 2008 by Palgrave Macmillan"--T.p. verso.
內容註:	Preface to the 2008 paperback edition -- Truthmakers, facts and states of affairs: a critiqueof correspondence -- Propositions, indirect speech and truthbearers -- Nature of propositions: thoughts versus states of affairs -- Facts are true thoughts -- From correspondence to identity -- Variety of deflationism defended -- Aberrations of rival identity theories.
標題:	Truth - Correspondence theory. -
電子資源:	http://link.springer.com/10.1057/9780230584266access to fulltext (Palgrave)
ISBN:	0230584268

An identity theory of truth
Dodd, Julian.

An identity theory of truth[electronic resource] /Julian Dodd. - Basingstoke :Palgrave Macmillan,c2008. - xi, 200 p.

"First published in paperback 2008 by Palgrave Macmillan"--T.p. verso.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Preface to the 2008 paperback edition -- Truthmakers, facts and states of affairs: a critiqueof correspondence -- Propositions, indirect speech and truthbearers -- Nature of propositions: thoughts versus states of affairs -- Facts are true thoughts -- From correspondence to identity -- Variety of deflationism defended -- Aberrations of rival identity theories.

This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation which holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. According to Julian Dodd,facts are not complexes of worldly entities; they are, as Frege believed, true thoughts. The supposed truthmaker is nothing but the truthbearer. The author christens this response to correspondence theories the modest identity theory, which he goes on to distinguish from those identity theories propounded, at some time or other, by Russell, Moore, Bradley, John McDowell and Jennifer Hornsby. It isacknowledged that the modest identity theory provides neither a definition of truth nor an accountofwhat truthconsists in. The modest identity theory's role is, by contrast, that of diagnosing thefailure of correspondence theories, and thereby preparing the ground for a proper deflation of the concept of truth: a deflation defended in the latter part of the book.

Electronic reproduction.
Basingstoke, England :
Palgrave Macmillan,
2009.

Mode of access:World Wide Web.

ISBN: 0230584268

Standard No.: 10.1057/9780230584266doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

671154
Truth
--Correspondence theory.Index Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

LC Class. No.: BD171 / .D63 2008eb

Dewey Class. No.: 121

An identity theory of truth
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500 $a "First published in paperback 2008 by Palgrave Macmillan"--T.p. verso.
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505 0 $a Preface to the 2008 paperback edition -- Truthmakers, facts and states of affairs: a critiqueof correspondence -- Propositions, indirect speech and truthbearers -- Nature of propositions: thoughts versus states of affairs -- Facts are true thoughts -- From correspondence to identity -- Variety of deflationism defended -- Aberrations of rival identity theories.
520 $a This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation which holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. According to Julian Dodd,facts are not complexes of worldly entities; they are, as Frege believed, true thoughts. The supposed truthmaker is nothing but the truthbearer. The author christens this response to correspondence theories the modest identity theory, which he goes on to distinguish from those identity theories propounded, at some time or other, by Russell, Moore, Bradley, John McDowell and Jennifer Hornsby. It isacknowledged that the modest identity theory provides neither a definition of truth nor an accountofwhat truthconsists in. The modest identity theory's role is, by contrast, that of diagnosing thefailure of correspondence theories, and thereby preparing the ground for a proper deflation of the concept of truth: a deflation defended in the latter part of the book.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Basingstoke, England : $c Palgrave Macmillan, $d 2009. $n Mode of access:World Wide Web. $n System requirements: Web browser. $n Title from title screen (viewed on Mar. 3, 2009). $n Access may berestricted to users at subscribing institutions.
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