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Career uncertainty and human capital.

The University of Chicago.

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Career uncertainty and human capital.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Career uncertainty and human capital./
作者:	Kovrijnykh, Andrei.
面頁冊數:	84 p.
附註:	Adviser: Canice Prendergast.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International69-04A.
標題:	Economics, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3309068
ISBN:	9780549568933

Career uncertainty and human capital.
Kovrijnykh, Andrei.

Career uncertainty and human capital. - 84 p.

Adviser: Canice Prendergast.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2008.

I study the problem of investment into specialized human capital under uncertainty. In the first part of the dissertation I analyze investment into reputation when ability is career-specific. Previous literature assumes ability equally valuable everywhere so that individuals can not escape bad reputation by changing their careers. The possibility of changing the career makes collection of reputational rewards less likely and therefore dampens incentives. However, I show that the wage becomes more sensitive to the reputation since the market anticipates the workers with good career matches to exert more effort. This effect countervails the direct incentive-weakening effect of career uncertainty. In fact it may be so strong that the expected marginal return on the reputation increases and the worker who is less certain about her career prospects puts in more effort as a result. I show that equilibrium effort is higher for workers facing moderate career uncertainty if their effort is sufficiently responsive to incentives. In general, both oversupply and undersupply of effort can occur in the equilibrium. One way to control the strength of reputational incentives is to manipulate the timing of information release: delaying the release of performance data weakens the incentives and can help avoiding excessive effort supply early in the career. The main focus of the second part is the choice of specialization by the workers in a general equilibrium model with two sectors, two sector-specific skills, and stochastic sector-specific productivity shocks. There are three reasons for less than perfect specialization: (1) risk-aversion, (2) decreasing returns in human capital accumulation, and (3) substitutability/complementarity between outputs. There are always some workers who fully specialize in a competitive equilibrium in a simple case when the realization of the shocks can take one of two values and the shocks are perfectly negatively correlated. Furthermore, if the productivity shocks have large enough variance, there will be some workers who acquire both skills. The competitive equilibrium is generally inefficient, and generates too little specialization compared to the social optimum where the social planner can use transfers among the workers. If the planner is not allowed to use these transfers, there will be less specialization in this constrained optimal outcome than in the competitive equilibrium. The numerical results on the equilibrium skill distribution illustrate the effect of the correlation between the productivity shocks on the specialization by the workers.

ISBN: 9780549568933Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Career uncertainty and human capital.
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