東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Essays in experimental games.

The University of Arizona., Economics.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Essays in experimental games.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in experimental games./
作者:	Dang, Timothy O'Neill.
面頁冊數:	190 p.
附註:	Adviser: Martin Dufwenberg.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International70-03A.
標題:	Economics, Commerce-Business. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3350429
ISBN:	9781109083897

Essays in experimental games.
Dang, Timothy O'Neill.

Essays in experimental games. - 190 p.

Adviser: Martin Dufwenberg.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Arizona, 2009.

This dissertation contains three essays describing experiments in game theory and economics. Chapter one studies mixed strategies by asking whether game players are willing to pay for randomization. A natural intuition for mixed strategies is randomization for unpredictability, but this is theoretically fragile. A player should only randomize between strategies if indifferent, and then could choose a disequilibrium strategy. Various theories describe mixed strategies not as random play, but heterogeneous pure-strategy play. I conduct experiments in which players can choose to pay a fee to use a randomization device, applied to O'Neill's zero-sum game. If subjects did so, it would show a strict preference for randomization over any available pure strategy. In fact, very few chose to use the randomization device. Subjects' descriptions of their decision process were consistent with the notion of purification.

ISBN: 9781109083897Subjects--Topical Terms:

626649
Economics, Commerce-Business.

Essays in experimental games.
LDR:03399nmm 2200349 a 45 001 891003
005 20101105
008 101105s2009 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781109083897
035 $a (UMI)AAI3350429
035 $a AAI3350429
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Dang, Timothy O'Neill. $3 1064980
245 1 0 $a Essays in experimental games.
300 $a 190 p.
500 $a Adviser: Martin Dufwenberg.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-03, Section: A, page: 0973.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Arizona, 2009.
520 $a This dissertation contains three essays describing experiments in game theory and economics. Chapter one studies mixed strategies by asking whether game players are willing to pay for randomization. A natural intuition for mixed strategies is randomization for unpredictability, but this is theoretically fragile. A player should only randomize between strategies if indifferent, and then could choose a disequilibrium strategy. Various theories describe mixed strategies not as random play, but heterogeneous pure-strategy play. I conduct experiments in which players can choose to pay a fee to use a randomization device, applied to O'Neill's zero-sum game. If subjects did so, it would show a strict preference for randomization over any available pure strategy. In fact, very few chose to use the randomization device. Subjects' descriptions of their decision process were consistent with the notion of purification.
520 $a Chapter two also studies mixed strategies, asking whether randomization is a property of individual choice or game play. In two experiments, game players are mirrored by guessers who make predictions about game play, distinguishing best-responding from game playing. In a Matching Pennies game, I find that game players are they are both more interested in unpredictability and actually more random. In an Asymmetric Matching Pennies game, I look at whether players are willing to forgo expected payoff in order to be unpredictable, and find little difference between players and guessers, with players being somewhat better at exploiting disequilibrium play.
520 $a Chapter three experimentally implements markets for competing goods with network effects. Markets with strong network effects often have multiple equilibria, including winner-take-all equilibria in which one firm has a monopoly. Firms may compete dynamically with the aim of locking-in to a favorable equilibrium. In this paper we create an experimental market with differentiated products and network effects. When lock-in is created by simulating naive buyers, monopoly does arise with sellers setting high prices. With human buyers, markets without switching costs are extremely competitive, with no support for stories of lock-in and monopoly. Markets with switching costs are inefficient, but this is overwhelmingly due to the individual switching costs rather than monopoly.
590 $a School code: 0009.
650 4 $a Economics, Commerce-Business. $3 626649
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
650 4 $a Psychology, Experimental. $3 517106
690 $a 0505
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0623
710 2 $a The University of Arizona. $b Economics. $3 1057439
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 70-03A.
790 $a 0009
790 1 0 $a Dufwenberg, Martin, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Fishback, Price $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Walker, Mark $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Wooders, John $e committee member
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2009
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3350429