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Understanding pretense: A look at t...

University of Arkansas.

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Understanding pretense: A look at theories of motivation.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Understanding pretense: A look at theories of motivation./
作者:	Grasser, Adam.
面頁冊數:	87 p.
附註:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 47-03, page: 1337.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International47-03.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=1461462
ISBN:	9780549962649

Understanding pretense: A look at theories of motivation.
Grasser, Adam.

Understanding pretense: A look at theories of motivation. - 87 p.

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 47-03, page: 1337.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Arkansas, 2008.

Over the past couple of decades, we have seen a tremendous explosion of research concerning the human's capacity to engage in episodes of pretense. One of the most interesting questions that have emerged out of this research involves the motivations that underlie this type of action. Specifically, why do we pretend? What are our motivations for engaging in this type of action? In response to these questions, a few scholars have offered theories which purport to explain our motivations for engaging in episodes of pretense---i.e. Peter Carruthers' action-based (emotional reward) theory of motivation, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich's thought-based (counter-factual) theory of motivation, and David Velleman's 'i-belief' and 'i-desire' theory of motivation. However, these theories of motivation seem to fall short, for they do not seem to capture the full array of motivations which underlie our episodes of pretense. In fact, these theories (singular account theories) posit a single motivating factor for human pretense. Consequently, they fail to account for some of the more inconspicuous episodes of pretense that humans engage in. Through an analysis of action, of which pretense is an expansive subset, we are able to identify, and thus fully appreciate, these inconspicuous episodes of pretense as well as distinguish a wide array of motivating factors from which we are impelled to pretend. This alleviates us from the impossible burden of trying to explain a broad subset of action (pretense) in terms of a single motivating factor as the singular account theories would have us do. As it stands, pretense, like action, is motivated by a wide variety of motivational factors. Thus, we should prefer a pluralistic account of motivation in order to fully appreciate the wide array of motivational factors that prompt human pretense.

ISBN: 9780549962649Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Understanding pretense: A look at theories of motivation.
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