東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Psychoanalysis, neuropsychiatry, and...

The University of Chicago.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Psychoanalysis, neuropsychiatry, and the mind: A philosophical inquiry into the contemporary status of psychological explanation.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Psychoanalysis, neuropsychiatry, and the mind: A philosophical inquiry into the contemporary status of psychological explanation./
作者:	Brendel, David Howard.
面頁冊數:	175 p.
附註:	Adviser: Michael Forster.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International60-08A.
標題:	Health Sciences, Mental Health. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9943047
ISBN:	9780599447271

Psychoanalysis, neuropsychiatry, and the mind: A philosophical inquiry into the contemporary status of psychological explanation.
Brendel, David Howard.

Psychoanalysis, neuropsychiatry, and the mind: A philosophical inquiry into the contemporary status of psychological explanation. - 175 p.

Adviser: Michael Forster.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 1999.

The rapid growth of neuroscience in the twentieth century raises questions about the relationship between psychological and neurological explanations of human action. Paul Churchland's theory of eliminative materialism says the trajectory of explanation is away from psychology and toward neuroscience, thereby raising the possibility that someday psychological concepts will disappear from our vocabulary. I open this essay by arguing why I consider eliminative materialism a coherent set of philosophical claims which should be engaged seriously. I proceed to call its core principles into question by identifying reasons why we still (and perhaps always will) use psychological concepts. I conclude that, far from being at risk of elimination, psychological explanations could assume an expanded role in the future.

ISBN: 9780599447271Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017693
Health Sciences, Mental Health.

Psychoanalysis, neuropsychiatry, and the mind: A philosophical inquiry into the contemporary status of psychological explanation.
LDR:03411nam 2200313 a 45 001 858443
005 20100712
008 100712s1999 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9780599447271
035 $a (UMI)AAI9943047
035 $a AAI9943047
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Brendel, David Howard. $3 1025495
245 1 0 $a Psychoanalysis, neuropsychiatry, and the mind: A philosophical inquiry into the contemporary status of psychological explanation.
300 $a 175 p.
500 $a Adviser: Michael Forster.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 60-08, Section: A, page: 2957.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 1999.
520 $a The rapid growth of neuroscience in the twentieth century raises questions about the relationship between psychological and neurological explanations of human action. Paul Churchland's theory of eliminative materialism says the trajectory of explanation is away from psychology and toward neuroscience, thereby raising the possibility that someday psychological concepts will disappear from our vocabulary. I open this essay by arguing why I consider eliminative materialism a coherent set of philosophical claims which should be engaged seriously. I proceed to call its core principles into question by identifying reasons why we still (and perhaps always will) use psychological concepts. I conclude that, far from being at risk of elimination, psychological explanations could assume an expanded role in the future.
520 $a Most philosophers who oppose eliminative materialism highlight the merits of "folk psychology," the principles we use to explain action in terms of propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires. I believe this is not the best strategy to use against Churchland because eliminative materialism seems to be far-fetched when dealing with ordinary action in people without brain dysfunction, but plausible when dealing with people whose brain lesions may explain their deviant behaviors. The linchpin of my argument against Churchland, then, is that even in cases marked by well-characterized brain pathology (the very cases where eliminative materialism seems at first glance most plausible), psychological concepts may retain critical diagnostic and therapeutic roles. And if psychology is relevant in cases of "organic" illness, then it will also be relevant in "nonorganic" illness (e.g., neuroticism) and ordinary action.
520 $a By examining the intellectual development of Sigmund Freud, who began his career as a neuroscientist but later shifted into psychology, we may discover reasons for retaining psychology that are relevant today. This is the main strategy I use to impugn Churchland's theory. Along the way, I describe cases where integrated psychological and neurological explanations are not only acceptable but quite cogent. I conclude that eliminative materialism is a form of scientism that overvalues mechanistic explanation and restricts the interdisciplinary flexibility that clinicians can effectively use in treating patients suffering from some of the most challenging mental disorders.
590 $a School code: 0330.
650 4 $a Health Sciences, Mental Health. $3 1017693
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
650 4 $a Psychology, General. $3 1018034
690 $a 0347
690 $a 0422
690 $a 0621
710 2 $a The University of Chicago. $3 1017389
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 60-08A.
790 $a 0330
790 1 0 $a Forster, Michael, $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 1999
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9943047