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A model of the military-industrial c...

Tufts University., Economics.

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A model of the military-industrial complex.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	A model of the military-industrial complex./
作者:	Oliver, Alexander J.
面頁冊數:	82 p.
附註:	Advisers: Marcelo Bianconi; Enrico Spolaore.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International47-05.
標題:	Economics, Theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=1463894
ISBN:	9781109118391

A model of the military-industrial complex.
Oliver, Alexander J.

A model of the military-industrial complex. - 82 p.

Advisers: Marcelo Bianconi; Enrico Spolaore.

Thesis (M.A.)--Tufts University, 2009.

This thesis constructs models of a nation's military, government, and defense industry and synthesizes these into a model of a military-industrial complex. Significantly, this model demonstrates that under a democratic regime in the nation, if the military proposes increases in defense expenditure to the government, increases in the implemented defense expenditure are not guaranteed. In fact, decreases may occur. This thesis derives the exact conditions under which each of these cases, resulting in increases or decreases in defense expenditure, occurs. Specifically, the democratic political process possibly limits the growth of defense expenditure, that is, frustrates the will of a particular interest group, the military-industrial complex.

ISBN: 9781109118391Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017575
Economics, Theory.

A model of the military-industrial complex.
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