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Electoral institutions, party organi...

Duke University., Political Science.

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Electoral institutions, party organizations, and political instability.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Electoral institutions, party organizations, and political instability./
作者:	Kselman, Daniel M.
面頁冊數:	257 p.
附註:	Advisers: Emerson Niou; Herbert Kitschelt.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International70-03A.
標題:	Political Science, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3352223
ISBN:	9781109086430

Electoral institutions, party organizations, and political instability.
Kselman, Daniel M.

Electoral institutions, party organizations, and political instability. - 257 p.

Advisers: Emerson Niou; Herbert Kitschelt.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duke University, 2009.

A majority of formal theoretic research in political science treats political parties as unitary actors, and endows them with decision-making powers not unlike those of strategic individuals. In contrast, my dissertation examines strategic equilibria which arise when competition takes place simultaneously within parties over organizational control and between parties over political office. I first distinguish between three intraorganizational elements: a party's parliamentary group, its activist cadre, and its executive leaders. Chapters 2-4 develop a set of foundational game theoretic models which identify the equilibrium balance of power among these 3 organizational elements as a function of a country's electoral institutions and voters' relative responsiveness to marginal policy changes. In turn, this more complete understanding of intra-party competition sheds light on a number of important questions in comparative politics and comparative political-economy. For example, it helps to identify conditions under which Duverger's argument that proportional representation (PR) should tend to generate multi-party competition may not apply; and, in contrast to Lijphart's famous argument, conditions under which PR may instigate rather than mediate social conflict. Ten months of intensive field research conducted in Turkey provide both the quantitative and the qualitative data which constitute the dissertation's most basic empirical material, including a data set of over 3,000 observations on party-switching in the Turkish Parliament (1983-2007).

ISBN: 9781109086430Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017391
Political Science, General.

Electoral institutions, party organizations, and political instability.
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245 1 0 $a Electoral institutions, party organizations, and political instability.
300 $a 257 p.
500 $a Advisers: Emerson Niou; Herbert Kitschelt.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-03, Section: A, page: 1011.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duke University, 2009.
520 $a A majority of formal theoretic research in political science treats political parties as unitary actors, and endows them with decision-making powers not unlike those of strategic individuals. In contrast, my dissertation examines strategic equilibria which arise when competition takes place simultaneously within parties over organizational control and between parties over political office. I first distinguish between three intraorganizational elements: a party's parliamentary group, its activist cadre, and its executive leaders. Chapters 2-4 develop a set of foundational game theoretic models which identify the equilibrium balance of power among these 3 organizational elements as a function of a country's electoral institutions and voters' relative responsiveness to marginal policy changes. In turn, this more complete understanding of intra-party competition sheds light on a number of important questions in comparative politics and comparative political-economy. For example, it helps to identify conditions under which Duverger's argument that proportional representation (PR) should tend to generate multi-party competition may not apply; and, in contrast to Lijphart's famous argument, conditions under which PR may instigate rather than mediate social conflict. Ten months of intensive field research conducted in Turkey provide both the quantitative and the qualitative data which constitute the dissertation's most basic empirical material, including a data set of over 3,000 observations on party-switching in the Turkish Parliament (1983-2007).
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790 1 0 $a Kuran, Timur $e committee member
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791 $a Ph.D.
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