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Explaining Authoritarian Populist Be...

Call, Samantha.

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Explaining Authoritarian Populist Behavior During Episodes of Democratic Backsliding.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Explaining Authoritarian Populist Behavior During Episodes of Democratic Backsliding./
作者:	Call, Samantha.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2024,
面頁冊數:	237 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-01, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International86-01A.
標題:	Political science. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31334792
ISBN:	9798383569061

Explaining Authoritarian Populist Behavior During Episodes of Democratic Backsliding.
Call, Samantha.

Explaining Authoritarian Populist Behavior During Episodes of Democratic Backsliding. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024 - 237 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-01, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Syracuse University, 2024.

The world has seen an increase in backsliding states in the past 15 years, with authoritarian populist leaders concentrating power through executive aggrandizement and limitations on civil liberties (Bermeo 2016). Democratic institutions are often targeted by an authoritarian populist during episodes of democratic backsliding either directly through taking away powers from the institutions or indirectly through using rhetoric to weaken public trust in the institutions. Scholars have identified patterns that suggest targeting the court and legislature first is the most common strategy of backsliders, while other institutions are targeted later. However, there is variation among these cases, with not all backsliders following this trajectory. In this dissertation, I investigate this variation to explain why institutions are targeted in the order and magnitude they are. Through an analysis of institutional threat and public opinion in relation to targeting behavior in three countries, Hungary, the United States (US), and Brazil, I find that institutional factors play an important role in backslider decisions about which institutions to target and in which order. On the other hand, contrary to what the literature would expect based on the responsiveness of populists to their voters, I do not find evidence that public trust in institutions impacts the order or type of targeting. These findings have practical applications in helping to identify and safeguard vulnerable but important institutions, as well as theoretical applications in terms of better understanding the observable patterns we see during episodes of democratic backsliding.

ISBN: 9798383569061Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Brazil

Explaining Authoritarian Populist Behavior During Episodes of Democratic Backsliding.
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