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Reference, Representation-as, and Di...

Shahmoradi, Ayoob.

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Reference, Representation-as, and Discrimination.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Reference, Representation-as, and Discrimination./
作者:	Shahmoradi, Ayoob.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2024,
面頁冊數:	191 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-01, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International86-01A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31329792
ISBN:	9798383258064

Reference, Representation-as, and Discrimination.
Shahmoradi, Ayoob.

Reference, Representation-as, and Discrimination. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024 - 191 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-01, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2024.

I develop a theory of (mental) reference according to which there are two ways of referring to an object. One can refer to an object by relying on a previous instance of successful reference to that (or some other) object. I call this type of reference dependent reference. Alternatively, one can refer to an object independently. A referential attempt is independent if and only if it is not dependent. I argue that these two types of reference differ as they adhere to different norms. While it may be possible to think about an object without the ability to uniquely individuate it if one thinks about it dependently, the same may not hold true in the case of independent thought. At least, the classic arguments that attempt to demonstrate the possibility of thinking about something without the ability to uniquely individuate it are irrelevant to independent reference. Furthermore, not all reference could be dependent.

ISBN: 9798383258064Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Dependent reference

Reference, Representation-as, and Discrimination.
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245 1 0 $a Reference, Representation-as, and Discrimination.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2024
300 $a 191 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-01, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Grush, Rick.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2024.
520 $a I develop a theory of (mental) reference according to which there are two ways of referring to an object. One can refer to an object by relying on a previous instance of successful reference to that (or some other) object. I call this type of reference dependent reference. Alternatively, one can refer to an object independently. A referential attempt is independent if and only if it is not dependent. I argue that these two types of reference differ as they adhere to different norms. While it may be possible to think about an object without the ability to uniquely individuate it if one thinks about it dependently, the same may not hold true in the case of independent thought. At least, the classic arguments that attempt to demonstrate the possibility of thinking about something without the ability to uniquely individuate it are irrelevant to independent reference. Furthermore, not all reference could be dependent.
590 $a School code: 0033.
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
650 4 $a Philosophy of science. $2 bicssc $3 2079849
653 $a Dependent reference
653 $a Different norms
653 $a Object
653 $a Classic arguments
690 $a 0422
690 $a 0402
710 2 $a University of California, San Diego. $b Philosophy. $3 1670992
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 86-01A.
790 $a 0033
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2024
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31329792