東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Absence in Nyaya and Mimaṃsa.

Beaulieu, Jack.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Absence in Nyaya and Mimaṃsa.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Absence in Nyaya and Mimaṃsa./
作者:	Beaulieu, Jack.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2023,
面頁冊數:	143 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-09, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-09A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30000547
ISBN:	9798377615989

Absence in Nyaya and Mimaṃsa.
Beaulieu, Jack.

Absence in Nyaya and Mimaṃsa. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2023 - 143 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-09, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto (Canada), 2023.

I examine competing views from Nyaya and Mimaṃsa philosophers about the epistemology of absence, which asks how we learn that an object or property is absent. In particular, I examine Nyaya defenses of, and Mimaṃsa challenges to, perceptualism, according to which we learn that an object or property is absent (abhava) by perceiving (pratyakṣa) its absence.In the first chapter, I introduce cases of past absence (praṅnastitasthala), purported counterexamples to perceptualism which involve agents learning in retrospect that an object or property was absent. I identify two groups of views about these cases: recollection views, according to which cases of past absence involve agents recalling negative information; and recollection failure views, according to which cases of past absence involve agents failing to recall positive information. I reconstruct two recollection views: a Bhaṭṭa view belonging to Uṃveka, and a Nyaya view belonging to Jayanta and Bhasarvajna. I then examine Salikanatha and Sucarita's critiques of recollection views.In the second chapter, I examine recollection failure views. I introduce the Bhaṭṭa philosopher Parthasarathi's view, following which I reconstruct the Nyaya philosopher Gaṅgesa's critiques. Gaṅgesa defends a similar view to Parthasarathi's that mends its difficulties and secures a perceptualist explanation of past absence. According to Gaṅgesa, agents learn that a recollectable (smaraṇarha) object or property was absent by inferring its past absence from failing to recall (asmaraṇa) that object or property.In the third chapter, I examine the Nyaya philosopher Raghunatha's attack on a condition according to which we are always aware of an absence as an absence of its counterpositive (pratiyogin), or its corresponding absent object or property. Gaṅgesa defends this condition, showing that it is supported by a plausible thesis about the epistemology of relational properties and motivates the Nyaya defence of absence as irreducible to a positive. But Raghunatha identifies cases in which the condition fails.Finally, I provide a translation of, and commentary on, a selection from the Pramaṇaparayaṇa by the Prabhakara philosopher Salikanatha. I argue that he defends a reductionist metaphysics according to which absence reduces to an awareness-event (buddhi), and knowledge of absence thereby reduces to self-knowledge.

ISBN: 9798377615989Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Epistemology

Absence in Nyaya and Mimaṃsa.
LDR:03512nmm a2200385 4500 001 2401509
005 20241022110503.5
006 m o d
007 cr#unu||||||||
008 251215s2023 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9798377615989
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI30000547
035 $a AAI30000547
035 $a 2401509
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Beaulieu, Jack. $3 3771604
245 1 0 $a Absence in Nyaya and Mimaṃsa.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2023
300 $a 143 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-09, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Ganeri, Jonardon.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto (Canada), 2023.
520 $a I examine competing views from Nyaya and Mimaṃsa philosophers about the epistemology of absence, which asks how we learn that an object or property is absent. In particular, I examine Nyaya defenses of, and Mimaṃsa challenges to, perceptualism, according to which we learn that an object or property is absent (abhava) by perceiving (pratyakṣa) its absence.In the first chapter, I introduce cases of past absence (praṅnastitasthala), purported counterexamples to perceptualism which involve agents learning in retrospect that an object or property was absent. I identify two groups of views about these cases: recollection views, according to which cases of past absence involve agents recalling negative information; and recollection failure views, according to which cases of past absence involve agents failing to recall positive information. I reconstruct two recollection views: a Bhaṭṭa view belonging to Uṃveka, and a Nyaya view belonging to Jayanta and Bhasarvajna. I then examine Salikanatha and Sucarita's critiques of recollection views.In the second chapter, I examine recollection failure views. I introduce the Bhaṭṭa philosopher Parthasarathi's view, following which I reconstruct the Nyaya philosopher Gaṅgesa's critiques. Gaṅgesa defends a similar view to Parthasarathi's that mends its difficulties and secures a perceptualist explanation of past absence. According to Gaṅgesa, agents learn that a recollectable (smaraṇarha) object or property was absent by inferring its past absence from failing to recall (asmaraṇa) that object or property.In the third chapter, I examine the Nyaya philosopher Raghunatha's attack on a condition according to which we are always aware of an absence as an absence of its counterpositive (pratiyogin), or its corresponding absent object or property. Gaṅgesa defends this condition, showing that it is supported by a plausible thesis about the epistemology of relational properties and motivates the Nyaya defence of absence as irreducible to a positive. But Raghunatha identifies cases in which the condition fails.Finally, I provide a translation of, and commentary on, a selection from the Pramaṇaparayaṇa by the Prabhakara philosopher Salikanatha. I argue that he defends a reductionist metaphysics according to which absence reduces to an awareness-event (buddhi), and knowledge of absence thereby reduces to self-knowledge.
590 $a School code: 0779.
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
650 4 $a Asian literature. $3 2122707
650 4 $a Epistemology. $3 896969
653 $a Epistemology
653 $a Perceptualism
653 $a Sucarita's critiques
653 $a Metaphysics
690 $a 0422
690 $a 0305
690 $a 0393
710 2 $a University of Toronto (Canada). $b Philosophy. $3 3180627
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 84-09A.
790 $a 0779
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2023
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30000547