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Reframing Mental Causation.
~
Aulisio, George J.
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Reframing Mental Causation.
紀錄類型:
書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:
Reframing Mental Causation./
作者:
Aulisio, George J.
出版者:
Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2024,
面頁冊數:
222 p.
附註:
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11, Section: A.
Contained By:
Dissertations Abstracts International85-11A.
標題:
Philosophy. -
電子資源:
https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31148658
ISBN:
9798382755380
Reframing Mental Causation.
Aulisio, George J.
Reframing Mental Causation.
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024 - 222 p.
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11, Section: A.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Temple University, 2024.
This dissertation explores the relationship between mental properties and physicalism to confront the apparent inconsistency between mental realism and the tenets of physicalism. As I see it, the major obstacle to fully integrating mental properties into physicalism is the feasibility of downward mental causation. Specifically, stringent physicalists find it contradictory to maintain that the mind can affect the body without contradicting the tenets of physicalism. This inconsistency claim is most notably addressed in the Causal Exclusion Argument.Though I am not personally committed to physicalism as an absolute worldview, I respect its prevalence and the reasons for its dominance. Rather than reject physicalism, I approach the puzzle with epistemological humility and attempt to work within the scope of physicalism. This exploration involves critically examining physicalism's leading mental-physical relationships, focusing on emergence as a plausible means to reconcile mental and physical properties without undermining either. Ultimately, I propose a modified form of physicalism that maintains its metaphysical and epistemological theses but in a milder form that is more conducive to emergent mental phenomena and the aspects of reality that are nonlinear and indeterminate.Guided by the work of Jaegwon Kim and Gerald Vision, this dissertation moves beyond their ideas, challenging reductionist perspectives within physicalism. The key contribution is the introduction of Dynamically Stable Causal Holism (or DSC Holism in brief), which represents a significant departure from traditional reductionist approaches, promoting a more holistic understanding of physicalism. Through nonlinear emergence{A0}and DSC Holism, I confront the Causal Exclusion Argument. A secondary original contribution is my approach to these puzzles. I integrate and synthesize concepts from the philosophy of science and special sciences to offer a fresh perspective on physically compatible mental realism and downward causation.
ISBN: 9798382755380Subjects--Topical Terms:
516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:
Causal Exclusion Argument
Reframing Mental Causation.
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This dissertation explores the relationship between mental properties and physicalism to confront the apparent inconsistency between mental realism and the tenets of physicalism. As I see it, the major obstacle to fully integrating mental properties into physicalism is the feasibility of downward mental causation. Specifically, stringent physicalists find it contradictory to maintain that the mind can affect the body without contradicting the tenets of physicalism. This inconsistency claim is most notably addressed in the Causal Exclusion Argument.Though I am not personally committed to physicalism as an absolute worldview, I respect its prevalence and the reasons for its dominance. Rather than reject physicalism, I approach the puzzle with epistemological humility and attempt to work within the scope of physicalism. This exploration involves critically examining physicalism's leading mental-physical relationships, focusing on emergence as a plausible means to reconcile mental and physical properties without undermining either. Ultimately, I propose a modified form of physicalism that maintains its metaphysical and epistemological theses but in a milder form that is more conducive to emergent mental phenomena and the aspects of reality that are nonlinear and indeterminate.Guided by the work of Jaegwon Kim and Gerald Vision, this dissertation moves beyond their ideas, challenging reductionist perspectives within physicalism. The key contribution is the introduction of Dynamically Stable Causal Holism (or DSC Holism in brief), which represents a significant departure from traditional reductionist approaches, promoting a more holistic understanding of physicalism. Through nonlinear emergence{A0}and DSC Holism, I confront the Causal Exclusion Argument. A secondary original contribution is my approach to these puzzles. I integrate and synthesize concepts from the philosophy of science and special sciences to offer a fresh perspective on physically compatible mental realism and downward causation.
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https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31148658
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