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Normativity's Call: Supererogation a...

Watson, Kevin.

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Normativity's Call: Supererogation and Moral-Epistemic Parallelism.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Normativity's Call: Supererogation and Moral-Epistemic Parallelism./
作者:	Watson, Kevin.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2023,
面頁冊數:	111 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-03, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-03A.
標題:	Ethics. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30574221
ISBN:	9798380322591

Normativity's Call: Supererogation and Moral-Epistemic Parallelism.
Watson, Kevin.

Normativity's Call: Supererogation and Moral-Epistemic Parallelism. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2023 - 111 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-03, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Kansas, 2023.

A growing amount of literature has come to recognize that, were moral and epistemic facts to exist, they would share a deep similarity. According to this literature, there is Parity between morality and epistemology and, as a result, the conclusions we reach about them will parallel one another in important respects. According to defenders of Parity, "epistemic facts and moral facts share deep similarities, so that whatever account is most plausible of the nature of one will be most plausible of the nature of the other." If Parity is right, we can expect certain truths with respect to some of these normative domains to hold true in others. I argue the most plausible versions of Parity imply the existence of the supererogatory within these two domains stands or falls together-i.e., that the fate of moral supererogation and epistemic supererogation are entwined. However, the existence of epistemically supererogatory beliefs is troubling. Thus, either it is not the case that there is Parity between morality and epistemology or there is no moral supererogation.Parity seems both intuitively appealing and of indispensable value for normative theorizing. Thus, while my argument is open to the view that morality and epistemology are not parallel, I opt for the view that there is no moral supererogation. However, there do appear to be supererogatory acts and attitudes-e.g., donating blood, helping an elderly person cross the street, donating to charity, and so on. I claim the phenomena of supererogation emerges as a result of the interaction between the reasons of parallel normative domains. In other words, the supererogatory is not a category within morality or epistemology, but something that emerges when we think wisely about what our normative reasons are and what they require of us.

ISBN: 9798380322591Subjects--Topical Terms:

517264
Ethics.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Normativity

Normativity's Call: Supererogation and Moral-Epistemic Parallelism.
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