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Ambidextrous Regimes: Leadership Sur...

Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina.

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Ambidextrous Regimes: Leadership Survival and Fiscal Transparency.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Ambidextrous Regimes: Leadership Survival and Fiscal Transparency./
作者:	Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2012,
面頁冊數:	404 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 73-11, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International73-11A.
標題:	Political science. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3505097
ISBN:	9781267290076

Ambidextrous Regimes: Leadership Survival and Fiscal Transparency.
Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina.

Ambidextrous Regimes: Leadership Survival and Fiscal Transparency. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2012 - 404 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 73-11, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duke University, 2012.

This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.

How do political leaders strategically manage fiscal policy formation to enhance their political survival? What are the implications of the fiscal mechanics of survival for theories of redistribution and democratic transition? This dissertation examines the complex relationship between political regime types and fiscal information asymmetries. I focus on budgetary policies (taxation and public spending) as major strategic tools available to the executive for co-optation and punishment of opponents. I argue that allowing some degree of contestation and transparency on the fiscal contract in electoral authoritarian regimes helps the executive identify distributive claims and co-opt the opposition. Paradoxically, in new democracies, political survival depends more on lower levels of budget transparency than existent theories would have us expect. Chapters 1 and 2 present a general formal model from which I derive the major hypotheses of the study. Second, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 use new cross-national measures of fiscal transparency and test empirically the theoretical implications. The statistical models confirm the main theoretical intuitions. Finally, Chapter 6 compares in greater detail the evolution of fiscal transparency in Morocco, Turkey and Romania between 1950 and 2000. I argue that fiscal taboos closely followed the shifting political alliance and their distributional consequences for leader's survival.

ISBN: 9781267290076Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Autocracies

Ambidextrous Regimes: Leadership Survival and Fiscal Transparency.
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300 $a 404 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 73-11, Section: A.
500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
500 $a Advisor: Remmer, Karen.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duke University, 2012.
506 $a This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a How do political leaders strategically manage fiscal policy formation to enhance their political survival? What are the implications of the fiscal mechanics of survival for theories of redistribution and democratic transition? This dissertation examines the complex relationship between political regime types and fiscal information asymmetries. I focus on budgetary policies (taxation and public spending) as major strategic tools available to the executive for co-optation and punishment of opponents. I argue that allowing some degree of contestation and transparency on the fiscal contract in electoral authoritarian regimes helps the executive identify distributive claims and co-opt the opposition. Paradoxically, in new democracies, political survival depends more on lower levels of budget transparency than existent theories would have us expect. Chapters 1 and 2 present a general formal model from which I derive the major hypotheses of the study. Second, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 use new cross-national measures of fiscal transparency and test empirically the theoretical implications. The statistical models confirm the main theoretical intuitions. Finally, Chapter 6 compares in greater detail the evolution of fiscal transparency in Morocco, Turkey and Romania between 1950 and 2000. I argue that fiscal taboos closely followed the shifting political alliance and their distributional consequences for leader's survival.
590 $a School code: 0066.
650 4 $a Political science. $3 528916
650 4 $a Middle Eastern studies. $3 3168421
653 $a Autocracies
653 $a Fiscal policy
653 $a Hybrid regimes
653 $a Morocco
653 $a Transparency
653 $a Turkey
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793 $a English
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