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A general theory of evidence and pro...

Clermont, Kevin M.

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A general theory of evidence and proof = forming beliefs in truth /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	A general theory of evidence and proof/ by Kevin M. Clermont.
其他題名:	forming beliefs in truth /
作者:	Clermont, Kevin M.
出版者:	Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2024.,
面頁冊數:	vii, 234 p. :ill. (some col.), digital ;24 cm.
內容註:	Introduction -- Kinds of Uncertainty -- Bivalent Probabilities -- Multivalent Beliefs -- Factfinding Deconstructed Logically -- Generalizing Beyond Factfinding -- Conclusion.
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Evidence (Law) - Philosophy. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-66552-3
ISBN:	9783031665523

A general theory of evidence and proof = forming beliefs in truth /
Clermont, Kevin M.

A general theory of evidence and proofforming beliefs in truth /[electronic resource] :by Kevin M. Clermont. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2024. - vii, 234 p. :ill. (some col.), digital ;24 cm. - Law and philosophy library,v. 1482215-0315 ;. - Law and philosophy library ;v. 148..

Introduction -- Kinds of Uncertainty -- Bivalent Probabilities -- Multivalent Beliefs -- Factfinding Deconstructed Logically -- Generalizing Beyond Factfinding -- Conclusion.

This book reframes the fundamentals of decisionmaking under uncertainty. For almost a century, theorists have spoken of truth-finding in terms of probability. They have said things like some past fact was 51% certain or proclaimed that in a civil dispute a fact must be shown to exceed a 50% likelihood. But such talk is a misleading misconception. The reason is that traditional probability fails to distinguish epistemic uncertainty from aleatory uncertainty. This conflation leads to mistakes such as invoking probability's product rules, which calculate a conjunction's likelihood as being low. From there, the theorists have argued that in a myriad of ways, the law violates the probability calculus unforgivably. Today, other theorists are newly realizing that in large part the law does not deal in probability. They now can defend the way that law has found facts since long before the invention of probability and on to the present. They are also reevaluating such intuitive practices as those that humans use in daily life to combine inferences upon inferences. A hotly contested literature has emerged. In a significant, comprehensive, and original contribution, this book develops a theoretical justification for the intuitive approaches that humans deploy across a broad range of decisionmaking. Instead of probability, the book focuses on degrees of belief that estimate, given the state of the evidence, how far a proposition has been fully proven. Instead of combining findings by the rules of probability, the book uses the rules of multivalent logic. The aim is to illuminate decisionmaking outside statistical analysis, showing that our ancient wisdom is in fact theoretically solid. The target is everyone interested in improving decisionmaking.

ISBN: 9783031665523

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-031-66552-3doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

1532839
Evidence (Law)
--Philosophy.

LC Class. No.: BF448

Dewey Class. No.: 153.83

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