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On the Economic Incentives of Scientific Inquiry.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	On the Economic Incentives of Scientific Inquiry./
作者:	Carniglia, Gian Luca.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (129 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-02A.
標題:	Philosophy of science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28410763click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798534676709

On the Economic Incentives of Scientific Inquiry.
Carniglia, Gian Luca.

On the Economic Incentives of Scientific Inquiry. - 1 online resource (129 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2021.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation is a collection of three economic theory essays on the incentives of scientific inquiry. In each of them I use formal modeling to analyze how some of the economic interactions in science may affect its epistemic performance.In the first chapter I model the interaction between a unitary mass of receivers of a costly public signal and a sender who has private interests on the actions receivers take. I extend a binary state of the world version of the standard Bayesian persuasion framework in two directions: allowing for heterogeneous priors and for hidden conflicts of interest. I find that regulating public information, for example disclosing financial support in scientific research, may reduce the sender's incentives to invest and may end up completely eliminating communication.In the second chapter I apply the classic Spence (1973) signaling model to academic job market incentives. Researchers with heterogeneous skills use publications like a channel to signal their types to employers. Journals, act as intermediaries for the message between researchers and firms. I show that in the presence of competition, research pursued in stable equilibria is independent of journals' goals. Signaling incentives prevail and researchers separate in the cheapest way possible, regardless of what social welfare function journals are trying to maximize.In the third essay I model the publication process as a principal-agent interaction between an editor and a researcher. The researcher privately runs experiments and selects some of the results to submit for publication. The editor acts as a social planner that tries to help the public taking better informed policy decisions. But the researcher's utility depends on the type of result that is being published, causing bias in her reports. We find that optimal publication rules take into account the researcher's payoffs, requiring higher standards when the conflict of interest is larger.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798534676709Subjects--Topical Terms:

2079849
Philosophy of science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Information designIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

On the Economic Incentives of Scientific Inquiry.
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