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Morality Across Time : = Exploring the Scope of Mutual Recognition.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Morality Across Time :/
Reminder of title:	Exploring the Scope of Mutual Recognition.
Author:	Ball, Robin Alexander.
Description:	1 online resource (53 pages)
Notes:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 82-11.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International82-11.
Subject:	Principles. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28387852click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798708775795

Morality Across Time : = Exploring the Scope of Mutual Recognition.
Ball, Robin Alexander.

Morality Across Time :Exploring the Scope of Mutual Recognition. - 1 online resource (53 pages)

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 82-11.

Thesis (M.A.)--Queen's University (Canada), 2020.

Includes bibliographical references

Actions performed in the present can profoundly influence the lives of future people. This fact raises two important questions: can future people be wronged, and if so, do present people have strong reasons to refrain from wronging them? This paper presents and defends a contractualist account of morality, and therefore a contractualist answer to the two questions raised. I argue that future people can be wronged and that each of us do have strong reasons to refrain from wronging them, in virtue of the fact that they belong to the moral relationship. I do this by describing the moral relationship, gesturing toward its intrinsic value, and arguing that its scope extends beyond proximal strangers to include both distant strangers and future people. Before considering the implications of this position for public policy, I respond to two prominent objections. The first objection utilizes the non-identity problem to challenge my claim that future people can be wronged. The second objection denies that the moral relationship is a salient source of obligation, therefore challenging my claim that present people have strong reasons to refrain from wronging future people. In response, I argue that the first objection misunderstands contractualist morality, and that the second objection fails to recognize our capacity to feel genuine concern for distant strangers and future people.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798708775795Subjects--Topical Terms:

3559989
Principles.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Moral relationshipIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

Morality Across Time : = Exploring the Scope of Mutual Recognition.
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245 1 0 $a Morality Across Time : $b Exploring the Scope of Mutual Recognition.
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500 $a Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 82-11.
500 $a Advisor: Kumar, Rabul.
502 $a Thesis (M.A.)--Queen's University (Canada), 2020.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Actions performed in the present can profoundly influence the lives of future people. This fact raises two important questions: can future people be wronged, and if so, do present people have strong reasons to refrain from wronging them? This paper presents and defends a contractualist account of morality, and therefore a contractualist answer to the two questions raised. I argue that future people can be wronged and that each of us do have strong reasons to refrain from wronging them, in virtue of the fact that they belong to the moral relationship. I do this by describing the moral relationship, gesturing toward its intrinsic value, and arguing that its scope extends beyond proximal strangers to include both distant strangers and future people. Before considering the implications of this position for public policy, I respond to two prominent objections. The first objection utilizes the non-identity problem to challenge my claim that future people can be wronged. The second objection denies that the moral relationship is a salient source of obligation, therefore challenging my claim that present people have strong reasons to refrain from wronging future people. In response, I argue that the first objection misunderstands contractualist morality, and that the second objection fails to recognize our capacity to feel genuine concern for distant strangers and future people.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2023
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Principles. $3 3559989
650 4 $a Motivation. $3 532704
650 4 $a Curfews. $3 3705938
650 4 $a Hunger. $3 783239
650 4 $a Famine. $3 3684126
650 4 $a Families & family life. $3 3422406
650 4 $a Pain. $3 533714
650 4 $a Morality. $3 3561985
650 4 $a Attitudes. $3 1973410
653 $a Moral relationship
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 lcsh $3 542853
690 $a 0422
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 783688
710 2 $a Queen's University (Canada). $3 1017786
773 0 $t Masters Abstracts International $g 82-11.
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