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The Idea of Nature : = Kant and Hegel on Nature, Freedom, and Philosophical Method.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The Idea of Nature :/
其他題名:	Kant and Hegel on Nature, Freedom, and Philosophical Method.
作者:	Koschel, Mathis Tilman Reinhard.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (244 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-09, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-09A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30248171click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798377640936

The Idea of Nature : = Kant and Hegel on Nature, Freedom, and Philosophical Method.
Koschel, Mathis Tilman Reinhard.

The Idea of Nature :Kant and Hegel on Nature, Freedom, and Philosophical Method. - 1 online resource (244 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-09, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2023.

Includes bibliographical references

The topic of my dissertation is the concept of nature and how Kant and Hegel each conceive of it. Both agree that 'nature' cannot be an empirical concept but is rather presupposed in all experience and object-related thinking. Yet, Kant holds that we can only conceive of nature as a unified whole when we conceive of it as a mechanical system. Whereas, according to Hegel, the unity of all the different kinds of natural phenomena can only be accounted for by means of his dialectical method. A crucial and novel point in my reading of Kant is that the concept of nature as a mechanical system is merely a regulative ideal, i.e., an imaginary end-point of science that we only approach asymptotically. It is this point that allows me to resolve long-standing puzzles in the scholarship regarding organisms and free will. For, this point allows for a coherent reading of Kant, a reading that involves that 1) we do in fact have experience of organisms and that 2) Kant's distinctive kind of determinism is compatible with an open future. My reading of Kant furthermore provides a uniquely suited entry-point into Hegel's dialectical account of nature, according to which not only human beings and organisms, but even solar systems do not fit the mould of a flat-footed mechanical determinism. This allows me to show that Hegel is - in several respects - both an inheritor and radicalizer of Kant.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798377640936Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

CausalityIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

The Idea of Nature : = Kant and Hegel on Nature, Freedom, and Philosophical Method.
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520 $a The topic of my dissertation is the concept of nature and how Kant and Hegel each conceive of it. Both agree that 'nature' cannot be an empirical concept but is rather presupposed in all experience and object-related thinking. Yet, Kant holds that we can only conceive of nature as a unified whole when we conceive of it as a mechanical system. Whereas, according to Hegel, the unity of all the different kinds of natural phenomena can only be accounted for by means of his dialectical method. A crucial and novel point in my reading of Kant is that the concept of nature as a mechanical system is merely a regulative ideal, i.e., an imaginary end-point of science that we only approach asymptotically. It is this point that allows me to resolve long-standing puzzles in the scholarship regarding organisms and free will. For, this point allows for a coherent reading of Kant, a reading that involves that 1) we do in fact have experience of organisms and that 2) Kant's distinctive kind of determinism is compatible with an open future. My reading of Kant furthermore provides a uniquely suited entry-point into Hegel's dialectical account of nature, according to which not only human beings and organisms, but even solar systems do not fit the mould of a flat-footed mechanical determinism. This allows me to show that Hegel is - in several respects - both an inheritor and radicalizer of Kant.
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