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A Philosophical Defence of Thought Experiments in Political Philosophy.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	A Philosophical Defence of Thought Experiments in Political Philosophy./
作者:	Mendie, Patrick Johnson.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (195 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-11, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-11B.
標題:	Collective action. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30403342click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798379476212

A Philosophical Defence of Thought Experiments in Political Philosophy.
Mendie, Patrick Johnson.

A Philosophical Defence of Thought Experiments in Political Philosophy. - 1 online resource (195 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-11, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Lancaster University (United Kingdom), 2022.

Includes bibliographical references

This thesis provides a defence of thought experiments in political philosophy, also known as 'political thought experiments' (PTEs). Different problems cast doubt on whether PTEs can be considered as being trustworthy. Critics think that the use of unrealistic hypotheticals in PTEs is problematic, especially when scenarios are completely detached from 'real' and 'recurring' situations as they occur in the actual world. I resolve this problem using the reflective equilibrium method, demonstrating how we can establish the logical equivalence between the unrealistic scenarios and the real-world counterparts with which they can be compared to understand their real-world implications. I also argue that since PTEs are arguments, the use of unrealistic premises does not affect the validity of their arguments. Critics also think that PTEs yield varying responses from different readers, meaning their intuitions are neither stable nor objective. I respond to this concern using John Norton's ' argument view' which proposes the idea that scientific thought experiments are disguised arguments, consisting of tacit premises and conclusions. I extend this view to PTEs, arguing that some PTEs contain valid arguments ruled by a system of logical inference. I examine some examples of PTEs by reconstructing them as valid arguments, arguing that PTEs with valid arguments are capable of evoking stable and objective intuitions. Finally, I discuss the concern of whether PTEs can motivate readers, in particular, how PTEs can be used in responding to real-world dilemmas. I establish the relationship between PTEs and narratives arguing that PTEs with 'narrative transport' would reasonably motivate readers. Using the problem of corruption in Nigeria as a case study, I show how PTEs can provide action guidance in responding to the issues of corruption in Nigeria. In conclusion, the original contribution of this research lies in the defenceof PTEs, and the claim that PTEs can be useful in solving real-world dilemmas.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798379476212Subjects--Topical Terms:

3556016
Collective action.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

A Philosophical Defence of Thought Experiments in Political Philosophy.
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520 $a This thesis provides a defence of thought experiments in political philosophy, also known as 'political thought experiments' (PTEs). Different problems cast doubt on whether PTEs can be considered as being trustworthy. Critics think that the use of unrealistic hypotheticals in PTEs is problematic, especially when scenarios are completely detached from 'real' and 'recurring' situations as they occur in the actual world. I resolve this problem using the reflective equilibrium method, demonstrating how we can establish the logical equivalence between the unrealistic scenarios and the real-world counterparts with which they can be compared to understand their real-world implications. I also argue that since PTEs are arguments, the use of unrealistic premises does not affect the validity of their arguments. Critics also think that PTEs yield varying responses from different readers, meaning their intuitions are neither stable nor objective. I respond to this concern using John Norton's ' argument view' which proposes the idea that scientific thought experiments are disguised arguments, consisting of tacit premises and conclusions. I extend this view to PTEs, arguing that some PTEs contain valid arguments ruled by a system of logical inference. I examine some examples of PTEs by reconstructing them as valid arguments, arguing that PTEs with valid arguments are capable of evoking stable and objective intuitions. Finally, I discuss the concern of whether PTEs can motivate readers, in particular, how PTEs can be used in responding to real-world dilemmas. I establish the relationship between PTEs and narratives arguing that PTEs with 'narrative transport' would reasonably motivate readers. Using the problem of corruption in Nigeria as a case study, I show how PTEs can provide action guidance in responding to the issues of corruption in Nigeria. In conclusion, the original contribution of this research lies in the defenceof PTEs, and the claim that PTEs can be useful in solving real-world dilemmas.
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