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Reasons, Causes, and Self-Determination.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Reasons, Causes, and Self-Determination./
作者:	Christman, Andrew Paul.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (114 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-12A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30250104click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798379741204

Reasons, Causes, and Self-Determination.
Christman, Andrew Paul.

Reasons, Causes, and Self-Determination. - 1 online resource (114 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 2023.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation considers several topics in the philosophy of action. After the introduction, which is the first chapter, the second chapter argues in favor of a causal approach to reasons-explanations by considering what I call ex-post-facto reasons-explanations-that is, reasons-explanations that cite attitudes that are formed after the completion of the action in question. The third chapter argues that free-will libertarianism can meet the explanation objection understood in terms of contrastive explanation in at least some cases. The fourth chapter defends what I call the asymmetry thesis-the claim that we can intend at will in a way that we cannot believe at will-against Pamela Hieronymi. The fifth chapter distinguishes between two forms of akrasia and argues that this distinction makes a difference to how we answer the question of whether epistemic akrasia is possible. The sixth chapter explains how we can avoid what I call the dilemma problem-that is, the problem of explaining how agents in a subjective dilemma are not necessarily akratic. The seventh chapter does three things: it brings the distinction between the two forms of akrasia previously mentioned to bear on the akrasia problem for the Guise of the Good Thesis, it explains how this response to the akrasia problem provides a way of responding to objections to a unified account of practical and theoretical reason that are based on alleged dissimilarities between practical and theoretical reason, and it considers a novel constitutivist approach to action that is suggested by my response to the akrasia problem. The overall idea that emerges from my dissertation is that we need to include self-determination in the story of action in addition to reasons and causes.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798379741204Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

ActionIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

Reasons, Causes, and Self-Determination.
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520 $a This dissertation considers several topics in the philosophy of action. After the introduction, which is the first chapter, the second chapter argues in favor of a causal approach to reasons-explanations by considering what I call ex-post-facto reasons-explanations-that is, reasons-explanations that cite attitudes that are formed after the completion of the action in question. The third chapter argues that free-will libertarianism can meet the explanation objection understood in terms of contrastive explanation in at least some cases. The fourth chapter defends what I call the asymmetry thesis-the claim that we can intend at will in a way that we cannot believe at will-against Pamela Hieronymi. The fifth chapter distinguishes between two forms of akrasia and argues that this distinction makes a difference to how we answer the question of whether epistemic akrasia is possible. The sixth chapter explains how we can avoid what I call the dilemma problem-that is, the problem of explaining how agents in a subjective dilemma are not necessarily akratic. The seventh chapter does three things: it brings the distinction between the two forms of akrasia previously mentioned to bear on the akrasia problem for the Guise of the Good Thesis, it explains how this response to the akrasia problem provides a way of responding to objections to a unified account of practical and theoretical reason that are based on alleged dissimilarities between practical and theoretical reason, and it considers a novel constitutivist approach to action that is suggested by my response to the akrasia problem. The overall idea that emerges from my dissertation is that we need to include self-determination in the story of action in addition to reasons and causes.
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