語系:
繁體中文
English
說明(常見問題)
回圖書館首頁
手機版館藏查詢
登入
回首頁
切換:
標籤
|
MARC模式
|
ISBD
FindBook
Google Book
Amazon
博客來
Aristotle on the Voluntary in the Eudemian Ethics.
紀錄類型:
書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:
Aristotle on the Voluntary in the Eudemian Ethics./
作者:
Sapkota, Gagan.
面頁冊數:
1 online resource (234 pages)
附註:
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-12, Section: A.
Contained By:
Dissertations Abstracts International83-12A.
標題:
Philosophy. -
電子資源:
http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=29066425click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:
9798802727010
Aristotle on the Voluntary in the Eudemian Ethics.
Sapkota, Gagan.
Aristotle on the Voluntary in the Eudemian Ethics.
- 1 online resource (234 pages)
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-12, Section: A.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Colorado at Boulder, 2022.
Includes bibliographical references
I argue that Aristotle's account of the voluntary in the Eudemian Ethics emerges as a response to the following kind of Platonic challenge: virtuous activity is not up to human beings, because if it were up to people to be virtuous, then they would be virtuous. Since human beings fail to be virtuous, this must be because it is not up to human beings to be virtuous. This kind of Platonic challenge has deep kinship with various arguments by which Plato argues that no one does wrong voluntarily. These sorts of challenges do not focus on whether the agent have open choices; rather, they focus on the hindrances that prevent human beings from attaining the best things in life. That is, it is the failure to attain the good things in life that suggest that human beings do not possess what it takes to attain the good things in life. These clusters of challenge, I shall argue, are undergirded by the following view of the voluntary: whether an action is voluntary is entirely a matter of whether the agent wants to do the action. According to Plato, the desire for the good is the central factor that determines whether an action is voluntary. In responding to these challenges, Aristotle not only seeks to show that it is up to human beings to be virtuous but also seeks to dismantle the underlying view of the voluntary that defines the voluntariness in terms of the agent's desire.In response to the Platonic challenge, Aristotle develops the view that human beings are controlling origin of their actions. has two major payoffs. In explicating what it takes for human beings to be the controlling origins of their actions, Aristotle offers an arrestingly simple requirement on responsibility: if an agent is responsible for their action, then the action must be because of the agent and not because of anything else. That is, according to Aristotle, it is not sufficient that our actions are dependent on us (as compatibilists interpretations of Aristotle assume). Aristotle requires that our actions must be dependent only on us.
Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023
Mode of access: World Wide Web
ISBN: 9798802727010Subjects--Topical Terms:
516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:
AristotleIndex Terms--Genre/Form:
542853
Electronic books.
Aristotle on the Voluntary in the Eudemian Ethics.
LDR
:03373nmm a2200397K 4500
001
2363283
005
20231121104556.5
006
m o d
007
cr mn ---uuuuu
008
241011s2022 xx obm 000 0 eng d
020
$a
9798802727010
035
$a
(MiAaPQ)AAI29066425
035
$a
AAI29066425
040
$a
MiAaPQ
$b
eng
$c
MiAaPQ
$d
NTU
100
1
$a
Sapkota, Gagan.
$3
3704045
245
1 0
$a
Aristotle on the Voluntary in the Eudemian Ethics.
264
0
$c
2022
300
$a
1 online resource (234 pages)
336
$a
text
$b
txt
$2
rdacontent
337
$a
computer
$b
c
$2
rdamedia
338
$a
online resource
$b
cr
$2
rdacarrier
500
$a
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-12, Section: A.
500
$a
Advisor: Lee, Mi-Kyoung.
502
$a
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Colorado at Boulder, 2022.
504
$a
Includes bibliographical references
520
$a
I argue that Aristotle's account of the voluntary in the Eudemian Ethics emerges as a response to the following kind of Platonic challenge: virtuous activity is not up to human beings, because if it were up to people to be virtuous, then they would be virtuous. Since human beings fail to be virtuous, this must be because it is not up to human beings to be virtuous. This kind of Platonic challenge has deep kinship with various arguments by which Plato argues that no one does wrong voluntarily. These sorts of challenges do not focus on whether the agent have open choices; rather, they focus on the hindrances that prevent human beings from attaining the best things in life. That is, it is the failure to attain the good things in life that suggest that human beings do not possess what it takes to attain the good things in life. These clusters of challenge, I shall argue, are undergirded by the following view of the voluntary: whether an action is voluntary is entirely a matter of whether the agent wants to do the action. According to Plato, the desire for the good is the central factor that determines whether an action is voluntary. In responding to these challenges, Aristotle not only seeks to show that it is up to human beings to be virtuous but also seeks to dismantle the underlying view of the voluntary that defines the voluntariness in terms of the agent's desire.In response to the Platonic challenge, Aristotle develops the view that human beings are controlling origin of their actions. has two major payoffs. In explicating what it takes for human beings to be the controlling origins of their actions, Aristotle offers an arrestingly simple requirement on responsibility: if an agent is responsible for their action, then the action must be because of the agent and not because of anything else. That is, according to Aristotle, it is not sufficient that our actions are dependent on us (as compatibilists interpretations of Aristotle assume). Aristotle requires that our actions must be dependent only on us.
533
$a
Electronic reproduction.
$b
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
$c
ProQuest,
$d
2023
538
$a
Mode of access: World Wide Web
650
4
$a
Philosophy.
$3
516511
650
4
$a
Ancient history.
$3
2144815
650
4
$a
Ethics.
$3
517264
653
$a
Aristotle
653
$a
Controlling origins
653
$a
Eudemian ethics
653
$a
Plato
653
$a
Voluntary
655
7
$a
Electronic books.
$2
lcsh
$3
542853
690
$a
0422
690
$a
0579
690
$a
0394
710
2
$a
ProQuest Information and Learning Co.
$3
783688
710
2
$a
University of Colorado at Boulder.
$b
Philosophy.
$3
1028866
773
0
$t
Dissertations Abstracts International
$g
83-12A.
856
4 0
$u
http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=29066425
$z
click for full text (PQDT)
筆 0 讀者評論
館藏地:
全部
電子資源
出版年:
卷號:
館藏
1 筆 • 頁數 1 •
1
條碼號
典藏地名稱
館藏流通類別
資料類型
索書號
使用類型
借閱狀態
預約狀態
備註欄
附件
W9485639
電子資源
11.線上閱覽_V
電子書
EB
一般使用(Normal)
在架
0
1 筆 • 頁數 1 •
1
多媒體
評論
新增評論
分享你的心得
Export
取書館
處理中
...
變更密碼
登入