東華大學圖書館 |

Credit for Compliance : = How Institutional Layering Ensures Compliance in China.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Credit for Compliance :/
其他題名:	How Institutional Layering Ensures Compliance in China.
作者:	Jee, Haemin.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (134 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-05, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-05B.
標題:	Government agencies. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=29756317click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798357512406

Credit for Compliance : = How Institutional Layering Ensures Compliance in China.
Jee, Haemin.

Credit for Compliance :How Institutional Layering Ensures Compliance in China. - 1 online resource (134 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-05, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2022.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation addresses a core dilemma of authoritarian politics: How can autocrats achieve social order without empowering the very institutions that could threaten their power? This dilemma reflects two sometimes conflicting goals of authoritarian regimes. They must often solve complex governance problems, which includes securing compliance with laws, regulating economic players, and in general, deterring rule-violating behavior. However, they also want to protect their political power, and the very institutions necessary to improve governance, such as the courts, often have democratic underpinnings that place constraints on autocratic power. I deem this the autocrat's legal dilemma. This dissertation explores state strategies in response to this dilemma in the case of contemporary China, the largest and arguably the most important authoritarian regime in the world today. Despite the popular view of China as a powerful one-Party regime that employs efficient control over society, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) finds it difficult to enforce regulations and secure compliance with laws. These fundamental governance objectives are hampered by a surprising lack of information sharing, local collusion between local state agents and sectors of society, and decentralized, fragmented enforcement schemes. However, like many authoritarian regimes, the CCP remains wary of strengthening judicial institutions, like the courts. If empowered, these institutions could constrain autocrats' future power or become sites of contention with aggrieved citizens. How does the CCP then effectively enforce laws without strengthening judicial institutions? This dissertation develops a new theoretical insight -- authoritarian regimes engage in institutional layering, creating new information-gathering and punitive mechanisms to secure compliance. In the first chapter of the dissertation, I lay out my theory of institutional layering and describe how features of China's legal and regulatory institutions, such as persistent information asymmetries and fragmented authority structures, demonstrate the need for a new institution. Finally, I propose that the social credit system, a much discussed yet little understood new institution in Chinese politics, illustrates the strategy of institutional proliferation. I argue the social credit system fills the functional gaps of existing legal and regulatory institutions by consolidating information about rule violators and doling out additional punishments. Chapter 2 of this dissertation uses original survey data to show that the social credit system is not interpreted as an extension of state surveillance by Chinese residents who are actually subject to the social credit system. There I will demonstrate that the social credit system does not in fact increase perceptions of state surveillance, state strength, or government performance and legitimacy. I begin with this empirical finding from the survey data to make apparent the core puzzle that the remaining chapters of the dissertation will then answer: what then is the purpose of the social credit system and how does it operate? Chapter 3 delves into the development and features of the social credit system. It outlines how the creation of the social credit system was motivated by problems of compliance with laws and regulations, drawing upon elite rhetoric at critical moments of the social credit system's development and interviews with policy makers tasked with designing the social credit system. The chapter then lays out the specific functions of the social credit system that allow it to improve enforcement of laws and regulations, namely information-consolidation and punitive functions. Descriptions of the core institutions under the social credit system demonstrate how these functions are accomplished in practice.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798357512406Subjects--Topical Terms:

3562805
Government agencies.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

Credit for Compliance : = How Institutional Layering Ensures Compliance in China.
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