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A Mechanism Design Perspective on Firms and Market Power.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	A Mechanism Design Perspective on Firms and Market Power./
作者:	Muir, Ellen Victoria.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (201 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-04, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-04A.
標題:	Prices. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=29342292click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798352600429

A Mechanism Design Perspective on Firms and Market Power.
Muir, Ellen Victoria.

A Mechanism Design Perspective on Firms and Market Power. - 1 online resource (201 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-04, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2022.

Includes bibliographical references

Each chapter of this PhD dissertation develops new mechanism design techniques to study the following three economic problems relating to firms with market power: (i) optimal pricing and product design (Loertscher and Muir, 2021b), (ii) optimal wage-setting and employment decisions (Loertscher and Muir, 2022), and (iii) optimal contracting by an input supplier and the decision of whether or not to offer a competing downstream product (Kang and Muir, 2022). The theoretical research that comprises this dissertation is targeted towards salient topics that are of interest to regulators and antitrust authorities. The first chapter (Loertscher and Muir, 2021b) of this dissertation considers the welfare implications of underpricing and rationing by a monopoly seller. These practices are considered something of a puzzle among economists. They are frequently observed in markets for perishable goods-such as tickets for an event-and often give rise to resale markets.1 This chapter develops a coherent model of these phenomena and deepens our understanding of the likely impact of policies such as the BOTS (Better Online Ticket Sales) Act, which reduces the efficiency of resale markets without banning them entirely.The second chapter of this dissertation (Loertscher and Muir, 2022) studies the implications of minimum wage policies when employers have market power. While the textbook model of a perfectly competitive market suggests that introducing a minimum wage can only reduce employment, it is well-known that imposing a minimum wage on a monopsony employer can increase employment.2 This chapter seeks to provide regulators with clearer guidance by showing how measures such as wage dispersion, efficiency wages and involuntary unemployment can be used to predict the implications of an increase in the minimum wage for employment.The third chapter (Kang and Muir, 2022) of this dissertation focuses on the antitrust implications of platforms that use their own marketplaces to sell in-house products. A natural example of such a platform is Amazon, which sells e-commerce and distribution services upstream, as well as its own private-label products (such as AmazonBasics) downstream. In this chapter we adopt a mechanism design approach to characterize the optimal menu of contracts that dominant platform offer in upstream markets. Our main result then shows that consumers always benefit-at the expense of other producers-from the platform's decision to offer a competing product downstream. Consequently, antitrust laws prohibiting platforms from selling their own private-label products, such as those recently implemented in India, can actually harm consumers.From a technical standpoint, many of the problems considered in this dissertation are partial mechanism design problems involving a designer that faces a group of agents whose outside options are endogenous to the mechanism. For example, in Loertscher and Muir (2021b) this arises in the context of a monopoly pricing problem where the monopoly faces a resale market. In Kang and Muir (2022) this arises in a vertical market structure, where only the upstream market is directly controlled by the designer. These problems are tackled by representing agents' endogenous outside options as constraints on the mechanism.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798352600429Subjects--Topical Terms:

652651
Prices.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

A Mechanism Design Perspective on Firms and Market Power.
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502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2022.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Each chapter of this PhD dissertation develops new mechanism design techniques to study the following three economic problems relating to firms with market power: (i) optimal pricing and product design (Loertscher and Muir, 2021b), (ii) optimal wage-setting and employment decisions (Loertscher and Muir, 2022), and (iii) optimal contracting by an input supplier and the decision of whether or not to offer a competing downstream product (Kang and Muir, 2022). The theoretical research that comprises this dissertation is targeted towards salient topics that are of interest to regulators and antitrust authorities. The first chapter (Loertscher and Muir, 2021b) of this dissertation considers the welfare implications of underpricing and rationing by a monopoly seller. These practices are considered something of a puzzle among economists. They are frequently observed in markets for perishable goods-such as tickets for an event-and often give rise to resale markets.1 This chapter develops a coherent model of these phenomena and deepens our understanding of the likely impact of policies such as the BOTS (Better Online Ticket Sales) Act, which reduces the efficiency of resale markets without banning them entirely.The second chapter of this dissertation (Loertscher and Muir, 2022) studies the implications of minimum wage policies when employers have market power. While the textbook model of a perfectly competitive market suggests that introducing a minimum wage can only reduce employment, it is well-known that imposing a minimum wage on a monopsony employer can increase employment.2 This chapter seeks to provide regulators with clearer guidance by showing how measures such as wage dispersion, efficiency wages and involuntary unemployment can be used to predict the implications of an increase in the minimum wage for employment.The third chapter (Kang and Muir, 2022) of this dissertation focuses on the antitrust implications of platforms that use their own marketplaces to sell in-house products. A natural example of such a platform is Amazon, which sells e-commerce and distribution services upstream, as well as its own private-label products (such as AmazonBasics) downstream. In this chapter we adopt a mechanism design approach to characterize the optimal menu of contracts that dominant platform offer in upstream markets. Our main result then shows that consumers always benefit-at the expense of other producers-from the platform's decision to offer a competing product downstream. Consequently, antitrust laws prohibiting platforms from selling their own private-label products, such as those recently implemented in India, can actually harm consumers.From a technical standpoint, many of the problems considered in this dissertation are partial mechanism design problems involving a designer that faces a group of agents whose outside options are endogenous to the mechanism. For example, in Loertscher and Muir (2021b) this arises in the context of a monopoly pricing problem where the monopoly faces a resale market. In Kang and Muir (2022) this arises in a vertical market structure, where only the upstream market is directly controlled by the designer. These problems are tackled by representing agents' endogenous outside options as constraints on the mechanism.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2023
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