東華大學圖書館 |

Self-governance of Water Resources Under Climate Change : = Insights From Cambodia.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Self-governance of Water Resources Under Climate Change :/
其他題名:	Insights From Cambodia.
作者:	Nhim, Tum.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (153 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-05, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-05B.
標題:	Behavior. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28760914click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798494449054

Self-governance of Water Resources Under Climate Change : = Insights From Cambodia.
Nhim, Tum.

Self-governance of Water Resources Under Climate Change :Insights From Cambodia. - 1 online resource (153 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-05, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Wageningen University and Research, 2021.

Includes bibliographical references

Worldwide, water governance is facing pressing challenges due to climate change. A smallscale irrigation system is thus no exception in this regard. An irrigation system is part of a social-ecological system (SES), in which the interactions between the subsystems are complex and nonlinear. The sustainability of such a system depends largely on the self-organizing capacity of resource users for collective action, for example by cooperating. This thesis focuses on a small-scale SES, namely an irrigation system which consists of the resource (water), water users (farmers), and the governance system (informal and formal institutions). I use evolutionary agent-based models and field experiments to analyzes under what conditions, and with which institutional mechanisms cooperative arrangements can be established and maintained under climate change.This thesis consists of six chapters. In Chapter 1 I describes the general societal and academic problem which lead to the scientific research questions. Further, I describe the contribution of the thesis to the current literature, and reflect on the research methods used in the thesis. In Chapter 2, I analyse how resource scarcity interacts with inequality and affects the emergence and stability of cooperative arrangements, using an evolutionary agent-based model. Findings in Chapter 2 show that social norms of cooperation may collapse in times of resource scarcity, and the dynamics are mediated by inequality and heterogeneity of users. This is especially the case if social capital and peer enforcement are weak. Thus, to understand better how climate change may affect the resilience of cooperative resource arrangements, the interactions between inequality and the role of institution in moderating scarcity needs to be considered. Chapter 3 investigates the role of scarcity further by looking at how it interacts with institutions, and affects cooperation among resource users who face coupled collective action problems. In particular, I consider the case where users are confronted with the social dilemma of commonpool resource extraction, as well as the public goods problem of investing in water infrastructure. Field experiments conducted in Cambodia suggest that existing institutions may respond to scarcity and vice versa. If the community has initially a functioning water system and a high level of cooperation, prosperity can be created, which facilitates further investments in water infrastructure, fostering cooperation further. If the community has initially a poorly functioning water system featuring resource scarcity, cooperation is relatively costly, undermining investments in water infrastructure, potentially giving rise to an institutional trap. Model results confirm these observations from field evidence, but also show that if social capital is stronger, the institutional trap can be overcome, and prosperity can be created. Findings in Chapter 3 explain further that institutional arrangements may respond to scarcity due to the presence of conditional cooperators. The findings also caution against considering social dilemmas in common pool resources and contribution to public goods in isolation, as the unfolding dynamics emerging from the interactions between the two coupled dilemmas may be very different than if considered alone.Chapter 4 takes a step further by studying the evolution of cooperation between two communities who share water as a common-pool resource and infrastructure as a public good. The results show that cooperation cannot be maintained when the public good is present, unless a reputation mechanism is in place. Further, the model results show that higher system productivity due to increased cooperation in the upstream community leads to more cooperation in the downstream community as well as higher welfare overall, but only in the presence of social interactions between communities. If cooperation in the downstream is enhanced, however, it does not translate into more cooperation in the upstream. This chapter highlights the tension to cooperate within and between communities of resource users, and that cooperation in both communities depends on social structure and characteristics that enable learning within and across communities.Chapter 5 is based on lab-in-the-field experiments in Cambodia, in which real field users of common-pool resources face two institutional choices: one resembles their existing informal institution in which the enforcement is weak, while the other resembles a more centralized enforcement mechanism in which enforcement is strict but costly. In the latter, this resembles a governance system of a farmer organization, the so-called Farmer Water User Community, which self-governs the small-scale irrigation system in the study area. Findings from Chapter 5 show a broad support for the costly institution, and even more so if players had been exposed to resource scarcity in the past, implying that individual experience about prior exposure to scarcity may have a connection with support for management institutions.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798494449054Subjects--Topical Terms:

532476
Behavior.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

Self-governance of Water Resources Under Climate Change : = Insights From Cambodia.
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245 1 0 $a Self-governance of Water Resources Under Climate Change : $b Insights From Cambodia.
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500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-05, Section: B.
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502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Wageningen University and Research, 2021.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
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In Chapter 1 I describes the general societal and academic problem which lead to the scientific research questions. Further, I describe the contribution of the thesis to the current literature, and reflect on the research methods used in the thesis. In Chapter 2, I analyse how resource scarcity interacts with inequality and affects the emergence and stability of cooperative arrangements, using an evolutionary agent-based model. Findings in Chapter 2 show that social norms of cooperation may collapse in times of resource scarcity, and the dynamics are mediated by inequality and heterogeneity of users. This is especially the case if social capital and peer enforcement are weak. Thus, to understand better how climate change may affect the resilience of cooperative resource arrangements, the interactions between inequality and the role of institution in moderating scarcity needs to be considered. Chapter 3 investigates the role of scarcity further by looking at how it interacts with institutions, and affects cooperation among resource users who face coupled collective action problems. In particular, I consider the case where users are confronted with the social dilemma of commonpool resource extraction, as well as the public goods problem of investing in water infrastructure. Field experiments conducted in Cambodia suggest that existing institutions may respond to scarcity and vice versa. If the community has initially a functioning water system and a high level of cooperation, prosperity can be created, which facilitates further investments in water infrastructure, fostering cooperation further. If the community has initially a poorly functioning water system featuring resource scarcity, cooperation is relatively costly, undermining investments in water infrastructure, potentially giving rise to an institutional trap. Model results confirm these observations from field evidence, but also show that if social capital is stronger, the institutional trap can be overcome, and prosperity can be created. Findings in Chapter 3 explain further that institutional arrangements may respond to scarcity due to the presence of conditional cooperators. The findings also caution against considering social dilemmas in common pool resources and contribution to public goods in isolation, as the unfolding dynamics emerging from the interactions between the two coupled dilemmas may be very different than if considered alone.Chapter 4 takes a step further by studying the evolution of cooperation between two communities who share water as a common-pool resource and infrastructure as a public good. The results show that cooperation cannot be maintained when the public good is present, unless a reputation mechanism is in place. Further, the model results show that higher system productivity due to increased cooperation in the upstream community leads to more cooperation in the downstream community as well as higher welfare overall, but only in the presence of social interactions between communities. If cooperation in the downstream is enhanced, however, it does not translate into more cooperation in the upstream. This chapter highlights the tension to cooperate within and between communities of resource users, and that cooperation in both communities depends on social structure and characteristics that enable learning within and across communities.Chapter 5 is based on lab-in-the-field experiments in Cambodia, in which real field users of common-pool resources face two institutional choices: one resembles their existing informal institution in which the enforcement is weak, while the other resembles a more centralized enforcement mechanism in which enforcement is strict but costly. In the latter, this resembles a governance system of a farmer organization, the so-called Farmer Water User Community, which self-governs the small-scale irrigation system in the study area. Findings from Chapter 5 show a broad support for the costly institution, and even more so if players had been exposed to resource scarcity in the past, implying that individual experience about prior exposure to scarcity may have a connection with support for management institutions.
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