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Can Money Buy Peace? Financing the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Can Money Buy Peace? Financing the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations./
作者:	Chen, Si.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (112 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-09, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-09A.
標題:	Political science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28961643click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798790657603

Can Money Buy Peace? Financing the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.
Chen, Si.

Can Money Buy Peace? Financing the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. - 1 online resource (112 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-09, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Buffalo, 2022.

Includes bibliographical references

It is well-known that the peacekeeping personnel and the costs of all UNPKOs are borne by every UN member-state. This raises an important question-what influences member-state's willingness to contribute? Existing literature mainly focused on figuring out factors that may drive member-states increase their personnel contribution and the relationship between the number of peacekeepers and the effectiveness of UNPKOs. Few of the studies took the financial contributions into consideration. This research tries to discuss how the foreign policy preference and trade relation affect UN members-state's financial contribution to UNPKOs by analyzing the performance of five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5). I argue that P5 are willing to contribute more money to a UNPKO if they share the similar policy preferences and interests or have intense trade relationship with the host country. Using an interaction model, I find the influence of diplomatic affinity on the willingness of a state to contribute more money is conditional on the degree of the foreign policy similarity between the host country and Russia. By comparing the impact of import, export and FDI flows, I find that P5 care more about their export destinations when making decisions on funding UNPKO. It has been proved that the larger size of UNPKO is more effective in preventing civilian victimization. I contend that peacekeeping budgets and expenditures are of the same importance. Using a quantitative analysis, I prove that the victimization on civilians decreases if the UN spends more money supporting the military and police personnel and the logistics.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798790657603Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Global policyIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

Can Money Buy Peace? Financing the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.
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