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Improved Robustness and Versatility of Lattice-Based Cryptography.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Improved Robustness and Versatility of Lattice-Based Cryptography./
作者:	Gong, Huijing.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	173 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-02B.
標題:	Computer science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28418485
ISBN:	9798534673234

Improved Robustness and Versatility of Lattice-Based Cryptography.
Gong, Huijing.

Improved Robustness and Versatility of Lattice-Based Cryptography. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 173 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Maryland, College Park, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Current public key cryptosystems that are based on the hardness of integer factorization and discrete logarithm are insecure in the presence of large-scale quantum computers. Much effort has been devoted to replacing the quantum-insecure cryptosystems with newly developed "post-quantum" cryptosystem candidates, conjectured to be secure against quantum attack. Lattice-based cryptography has been widely recognized as a prominent candidate for practical post-quantum security.This dissertation improves the robustness and versatility of lattice-based cryptography through the following three contributions:1. Chapter 3 introduces a constant-round protocol for unauthenticated group key exchange (i.e., with security against a passive eavesdropper). Group key exchange protocols allow a set of N parties to agree on a shared, secret key by communicating over a public network. Our protocol is based on the hardness of a lattice problem, which hence yields (plausible) post-quantum security.2. In Chapter 4, we propose a framework for cryptanalysis of lattice-based schemes when certain types of information about the secret are leaked. Our framework generalizes the primal lattice reduction attack. The generalization allows for integrating the leaked information progressively before running a final lattice reduction step. Our framework can estimate the amount of security loss caused by the leaked information, and perform lattice reduction attacks with leaked information when computationally feasible.3. Chapter 5 introduces an approach towards a ring analogue of the Leftover Hash Lemma (LHL). The LHL is a mathematical tool often used in the analysis of various lattice-based cryptosystems, as well as their leakage-resilient counterparts. However, it does not hold in the ring setting, which is typical for efficient cryptosystems. Lyubashevsky et al. (Eurocrypt '13) proved a "regularity lemma," which is used in the ring setting instead of the LHL; however, this applies only for centered, spherical Gaussian inputs, while the LHL applies when the input is drawn from any high min-entropy distribution. Our approach generalizes the "regularity lemma" of Lyubashevsky et al. to certain conditional distributions. A number of Ring-Learning with Errors based cryptosystems can achieve certain leakage resilience properties using our results.

ISBN: 9798534673234Subjects--Topical Terms:

523869
Computer science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Cryptanalysis

Improved Robustness and Versatility of Lattice-Based Cryptography.
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520 $a Current public key cryptosystems that are based on the hardness of integer factorization and discrete logarithm are insecure in the presence of large-scale quantum computers. Much effort has been devoted to replacing the quantum-insecure cryptosystems with newly developed "post-quantum" cryptosystem candidates, conjectured to be secure against quantum attack. Lattice-based cryptography has been widely recognized as a prominent candidate for practical post-quantum security.This dissertation improves the robustness and versatility of lattice-based cryptography through the following three contributions:1. Chapter 3 introduces a constant-round protocol for unauthenticated group key exchange (i.e., with security against a passive eavesdropper). Group key exchange protocols allow a set of N parties to agree on a shared, secret key by communicating over a public network. Our protocol is based on the hardness of a lattice problem, which hence yields (plausible) post-quantum security.2. In Chapter 4, we propose a framework for cryptanalysis of lattice-based schemes when certain types of information about the secret are leaked. Our framework generalizes the primal lattice reduction attack. The generalization allows for integrating the leaked information progressively before running a final lattice reduction step. Our framework can estimate the amount of security loss caused by the leaked information, and perform lattice reduction attacks with leaked information when computationally feasible.3. Chapter 5 introduces an approach towards a ring analogue of the Leftover Hash Lemma (LHL). The LHL is a mathematical tool often used in the analysis of various lattice-based cryptosystems, as well as their leakage-resilient counterparts. However, it does not hold in the ring setting, which is typical for efficient cryptosystems. Lyubashevsky et al. (Eurocrypt '13) proved a "regularity lemma," which is used in the ring setting instead of the LHL; however, this applies only for centered, spherical Gaussian inputs, while the LHL applies when the input is drawn from any high min-entropy distribution. Our approach generalizes the "regularity lemma" of Lyubashevsky et al. to certain conditional distributions. A number of Ring-Learning with Errors based cryptosystems can achieve certain leakage resilience properties using our results.
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