東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Essays in the Economics of Housing and Labor Markets.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays in the Economics of Housing and Labor Markets./
Author:	Qian, Franklin Zongjin.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
Description:	281 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-06, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-06A.
Subject:	Housing. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28688428
ISBN:	9798544204848

Essays in the Economics of Housing and Labor Markets.
Qian, Franklin Zongjin.

Essays in the Economics of Housing and Labor Markets. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 281 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-06, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

The first chapter is joint with Rebecca Diamond and Timothy McQuade. We investigate the consequences of the 1994 rent-control expansion in San Francisco on tenants, landlords, and equilibrium outcomes in the rental market. Using a 1994 law change, we exploit quasi-experimental variation in the assignment of rent control in San Francisco to study its impacts on tenants and landlords. Leveraging new data tracking individuals' migration, we find rent control limits renters' mobility by 20% and lowers displacement from San Francisco. Landlords treated by rent control reduce rental housing supplies by 15% by selling to owner-occupants and redeveloping buildings. Thus, while rent control prevents displacement of incumbent renters in the short run, the lost rental housing supply drove up market rents in the long run by 5.1%, ultimately undermining the goals of the law. Using a dynamic, neighborhood choice model, we find rent control o↵ered large benefits to covered tenants. Welfare losses from decreased housing supply could be mitigated if insurance against rent increases were provided as government social insurance, instead of a regulated landlord mandate.The second chapter consists of my job-market paper, joint with Rose Tan. We investigate the consequences of high-skilled firm entry on nearby a↵ected neighborhoods and incumbent residents living in those neighborhoods. To study this, we construct a dataset of 391 such entries in the U.S. from 1990-2010. We follow incumbent residents over 13 years using rich micro-data on individual address histories, property characteristics, and financial records. First, we estimate the e↵ects of the firm entry on incumbent residents' consumption, finances, and mobility. To do so, we compare outcomes for residents living close to the entry location with those living far away, while controlling for their proximity to potential high-skilled firm entry sites. Next, we decompose welfare from changes in wages, rents, and amenities for incumbent residents using a model of individual home and work location choice. Taken together, our results show high-skilled incumbents, especially homeowners, benefit. Low-skilled owners benefit less than high-skilled owners. Low-skilled renters are harmed. In the medium to long run, they incur an annual welfare loss that is equivalent to a 0.2 percent decline in their wages one year prior to the entry. While the typical high-skilled firm entry has moderate welfare consequences on a per capita basis, the negative welfare consequences for low-skilled renters could be large for some more extreme firm entries. Housing assistance in the form of a↵ordable housing and rental insurance, as well as property tax scheme could be used to mitigate the negative distributional consequences of high-skilled firm entries.The third chapter is joint with Haaris Mateen and Ye Zhang. We study the microstructure of the U.S. housing market using a novel data set comprising housing search and bargaining behavior for millions of interactions between sellers and buyers. We first establish a number of stylized facts, the most prominent being a nearly 50-50 split between houses that sold below final listing price and those that sold above final listing price. Second, we compare observed behavior with predictions from a large theoretical housing literature.

ISBN: 9798544204848Subjects--Topical Terms:

562261
Housing.

Essays in the Economics of Housing and Labor Markets.
LDR:04341nmm a2200301 4500 001 2352501
005 20221128104000.5
008 241004s2021 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9798544204848
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI28688428
035 $a (MiAaPQ)STANFORDbm034fk0925
035 $a AAI28688428
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Qian, Franklin Zongjin. $3 3692133
245 1 0 $a Essays in the Economics of Housing and Labor Markets.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2021
300 $a 281 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-06, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Diamond, Rebecca;Einav, Liran.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2021.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a The first chapter is joint with Rebecca Diamond and Timothy McQuade. We investigate the consequences of the 1994 rent-control expansion in San Francisco on tenants, landlords, and equilibrium outcomes in the rental market. Using a 1994 law change, we exploit quasi-experimental variation in the assignment of rent control in San Francisco to study its impacts on tenants and landlords. Leveraging new data tracking individuals' migration, we find rent control limits renters' mobility by 20% and lowers displacement from San Francisco. Landlords treated by rent control reduce rental housing supplies by 15% by selling to owner-occupants and redeveloping buildings. Thus, while rent control prevents displacement of incumbent renters in the short run, the lost rental housing supply drove up market rents in the long run by 5.1%, ultimately undermining the goals of the law. Using a dynamic, neighborhood choice model, we find rent control o↵ered large benefits to covered tenants. Welfare losses from decreased housing supply could be mitigated if insurance against rent increases were provided as government social insurance, instead of a regulated landlord mandate.The second chapter consists of my job-market paper, joint with Rose Tan. We investigate the consequences of high-skilled firm entry on nearby a↵ected neighborhoods and incumbent residents living in those neighborhoods. To study this, we construct a dataset of 391 such entries in the U.S. from 1990-2010. We follow incumbent residents over 13 years using rich micro-data on individual address histories, property characteristics, and financial records. First, we estimate the e↵ects of the firm entry on incumbent residents' consumption, finances, and mobility. To do so, we compare outcomes for residents living close to the entry location with those living far away, while controlling for their proximity to potential high-skilled firm entry sites. Next, we decompose welfare from changes in wages, rents, and amenities for incumbent residents using a model of individual home and work location choice. Taken together, our results show high-skilled incumbents, especially homeowners, benefit. Low-skilled owners benefit less than high-skilled owners. Low-skilled renters are harmed. In the medium to long run, they incur an annual welfare loss that is equivalent to a 0.2 percent decline in their wages one year prior to the entry. While the typical high-skilled firm entry has moderate welfare consequences on a per capita basis, the negative welfare consequences for low-skilled renters could be large for some more extreme firm entries. Housing assistance in the form of a↵ordable housing and rental insurance, as well as property tax scheme could be used to mitigate the negative distributional consequences of high-skilled firm entries.The third chapter is joint with Haaris Mateen and Ye Zhang. We study the microstructure of the U.S. housing market using a novel data set comprising housing search and bargaining behavior for millions of interactions between sellers and buyers. We first establish a number of stylized facts, the most prominent being a nearly 50-50 split between houses that sold below final listing price and those that sold above final listing price. Second, we compare observed behavior with predictions from a large theoretical housing literature.
590 $a School code: 0212.
650 4 $a Housing. $3 562261
650 4 $a Censuses. $3 3564174
650 4 $a Race. $3 529036
650 4 $a Neighborhoods. $3 993475
650 4 $a Equilibrium. $3 668417
650 4 $a Tenants. $3 3692134
650 4 $a Urban planning. $3 2122922
690 $a 0999
710 2 $a Stanford University. $3 754827
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-06A.
790 $a 0212
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2021
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28688428