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The Politics of the American Knowledge Economy.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The Politics of the American Knowledge Economy./
作者:	Short, Nicholas.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2022,
面頁冊數:	188 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-12, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-12A.
標題:	Political science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=29206501
ISBN:	9798819381489

The Politics of the American Knowledge Economy.
Short, Nicholas.

The Politics of the American Knowledge Economy. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2022 - 188 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-12, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2022.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Many scholars now accept that, at some point during the last forty years, the United States transitioned from a Fordist economy rooted in mass production to a post-Fordist "knowledge economy." And yet, there is surprisingly little consensus about how we should define or characterize the American knowledge economy (AKE) we now inhabit. At the same time, though the AKE has become a subject of increasing interest for political scientists, especially those studying American political economy, we still know relatively little about how American political institutions shaped knowledge economy development in the United States, about the mechanisms by which the knowledge economy transition has exacerbated various forms of inequality, and about the relationship between the knowledge economy transition and the Democratic Party's dramatic shift in its attitude towards antitrust enforcement. In this four-paper dissertation, I address each of these questions.In the first paper, I argue that we should understand the AKE not as a growth regime geared towards the production of knowledge, per se, nor as a growth regime driven by middleclass demands for policies that promote human capital formation like education, but as a growth regime organized around the production and utilization of commodified technological knowledge or intellectual property (IP). Drawing predominately on historical sources and archival data, I show that the knowledge economy became the Democratic Party's alternative to Keynesian macroeconomic management in the 1980s and 1990s, but American political institutions-especially bi-cameralism-forced the Party to abandon policies that would have given the government a significant role in shaping AKE development in favor of market-oriented policies to strengthen and expand the geographic reach of IP rights. In this way, the AKE developed in a way that responded more to the demands of organized business interests and less to the demands of decisive middle-class voters.In the second paper, I argue that this distinctive form of knowledge economy exacerbates geographic, economic, and political inequalities and intersects with increasing financialization in doing so. Drawing on novel time series data and prior studies of inequality, I argue that the Democratic Party abandoned policies that would have stoked knowledge economy formation across more geographic space in favor of policies that magnified the pre-existing advantages of those regions that benefited from Cold War defense spending. The Party also abandoned institutions and policies that might have promoted greater knowledge economy participation among the working and middle classes in favor of policies that confer enormous benefits on relatively small groups of already affluent workers. And in a setting of rising financialization, the businesses that produce valuable IP have distinguished themselves, even when compared to other large companies, in their power to charge high markups, in their willingness to spend huge sums acquiring potential competitors, and in their ability to avoid paying taxes.In the third paper, I investigate whether the Democratic Party's turn towards the knowledge economy has delivered electoral benefits among the knowledge economy's most valuable constituency: American inventors. Drawing upon a unique dataset showing campaign contributions made by more than 30,000 American inventors from 1980 to 2014, I show that the Democratic Party has become much more competitive within this constituency, but that American political institutions especially majoritarian elections in single-member districts-have caused most inventor donations to come from only a few regions and flow to only a few candidates, thereby limiting their electoral impact. Similarly, while American inventors that donate to Democrats have become more liberal, that behavioral shift is driven mostly by regional changes as American inventors who contribute to Democrats increasingly find themselves working and living in liberal enclaves.In the fourth paper, I explore how the Democratic Party's turn towards the knowledge economy has influenced its approach to antitrust enforcement. In a series of empirical exercises utilizing observational data, I show that the federal government began challenging large mergers and acquisitions at much lower rates in 1981 and that subsequent Democratic presidents did notrevert to more robust enforcement. This shift in administrative priorities has delivered concrete economic benefits to those regions that participate heavily in the knowledge economy, and the younger and more affluent people who work in these regions have in turn developed somewhat unique preferences with respect to antitrust enforcement: in all other states, increasing Democratic partisanship is associated with increasing support for more robust enforcement, but in knowledgeeconomy states, Democratic partisanship leads to more opposition.Taken together, the findings in these papers have a few broader implications for the study of American political economy. Foremost, the findings suggest that American political institutions have the potential for "double marginalization" in economic policymaking, first by confining the policy choice set to those "neoliberal" policies that enhance existing geographic disparities then by confining the electoral benefits to those candidates who represent regions with pre-existing advantages. In this sense, AKE development can be seen as a case study in the ways that American political institutions can inhibit the formation of cross-regional coalitions needed to undertake ambitious economic reforms. The findings also reinforce prior work in political geography, especially that of Jonathan Rodden, in showing that AKE development has more strongly influenced regional rather than individual identities and political behaviors. Finally, the findings also suggest that partisan realignment, and not just federal policymaking, can be driven by policy feedbacks. As the Democratic Party became the party of technology and relied on policies that are known to exacerbate market power to promote technological change, the regions that benefited from these policies have developed distinct policy preferences that may inhibit the Party's ability to pursue needed reforms.

ISBN: 9798819381489Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Fordist economies

The Politics of the American Knowledge Economy.
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520 $a Many scholars now accept that, at some point during the last forty years, the United States transitioned from a Fordist economy rooted in mass production to a post-Fordist "knowledge economy." And yet, there is surprisingly little consensus about how we should define or characterize the American knowledge economy (AKE) we now inhabit. At the same time, though the AKE has become a subject of increasing interest for political scientists, especially those studying American political economy, we still know relatively little about how American political institutions shaped knowledge economy development in the United States, about the mechanisms by which the knowledge economy transition has exacerbated various forms of inequality, and about the relationship between the knowledge economy transition and the Democratic Party's dramatic shift in its attitude towards antitrust enforcement. In this four-paper dissertation, I address each of these questions.In the first paper, I argue that we should understand the AKE not as a growth regime geared towards the production of knowledge, per se, nor as a growth regime driven by middleclass demands for policies that promote human capital formation like education, but as a growth regime organized around the production and utilization of commodified technological knowledge or intellectual property (IP). Drawing predominately on historical sources and archival data, I show that the knowledge economy became the Democratic Party's alternative to Keynesian macroeconomic management in the 1980s and 1990s, but American political institutions-especially bi-cameralism-forced the Party to abandon policies that would have given the government a significant role in shaping AKE development in favor of market-oriented policies to strengthen and expand the geographic reach of IP rights. In this way, the AKE developed in a way that responded more to the demands of organized business interests and less to the demands of decisive middle-class voters.In the second paper, I argue that this distinctive form of knowledge economy exacerbates geographic, economic, and political inequalities and intersects with increasing financialization in doing so. Drawing on novel time series data and prior studies of inequality, I argue that the Democratic Party abandoned policies that would have stoked knowledge economy formation across more geographic space in favor of policies that magnified the pre-existing advantages of those regions that benefited from Cold War defense spending. The Party also abandoned institutions and policies that might have promoted greater knowledge economy participation among the working and middle classes in favor of policies that confer enormous benefits on relatively small groups of already affluent workers. And in a setting of rising financialization, the businesses that produce valuable IP have distinguished themselves, even when compared to other large companies, in their power to charge high markups, in their willingness to spend huge sums acquiring potential competitors, and in their ability to avoid paying taxes.In the third paper, I investigate whether the Democratic Party's turn towards the knowledge economy has delivered electoral benefits among the knowledge economy's most valuable constituency: American inventors. Drawing upon a unique dataset showing campaign contributions made by more than 30,000 American inventors from 1980 to 2014, I show that the Democratic Party has become much more competitive within this constituency, but that American political institutions especially majoritarian elections in single-member districts-have caused most inventor donations to come from only a few regions and flow to only a few candidates, thereby limiting their electoral impact. Similarly, while American inventors that donate to Democrats have become more liberal, that behavioral shift is driven mostly by regional changes as American inventors who contribute to Democrats increasingly find themselves working and living in liberal enclaves.In the fourth paper, I explore how the Democratic Party's turn towards the knowledge economy has influenced its approach to antitrust enforcement. In a series of empirical exercises utilizing observational data, I show that the federal government began challenging large mergers and acquisitions at much lower rates in 1981 and that subsequent Democratic presidents did notrevert to more robust enforcement. This shift in administrative priorities has delivered concrete economic benefits to those regions that participate heavily in the knowledge economy, and the younger and more affluent people who work in these regions have in turn developed somewhat unique preferences with respect to antitrust enforcement: in all other states, increasing Democratic partisanship is associated with increasing support for more robust enforcement, but in knowledgeeconomy states, Democratic partisanship leads to more opposition.Taken together, the findings in these papers have a few broader implications for the study of American political economy. Foremost, the findings suggest that American political institutions have the potential for "double marginalization" in economic policymaking, first by confining the policy choice set to those "neoliberal" policies that enhance existing geographic disparities then by confining the electoral benefits to those candidates who represent regions with pre-existing advantages. In this sense, AKE development can be seen as a case study in the ways that American political institutions can inhibit the formation of cross-regional coalitions needed to undertake ambitious economic reforms. The findings also reinforce prior work in political geography, especially that of Jonathan Rodden, in showing that AKE development has more strongly influenced regional rather than individual identities and political behaviors. Finally, the findings also suggest that partisan realignment, and not just federal policymaking, can be driven by policy feedbacks. As the Democratic Party became the party of technology and relied on policies that are known to exacerbate market power to promote technological change, the regions that benefited from these policies have developed distinct policy preferences that may inhibit the Party's ability to pursue needed reforms.
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